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Abstract 
A financial crisis is consisted by a major event or a series of events. Event 
analysis can be used to analyse the causes of the financial crisis. In this paper, 
we use the Bear Stearns event and the Lehman Brothers event to analyse the 
causes of the Global Financial Crisis, find the weakness of our financial 
system and therefore, we suggest remedy the regulatory shortcomings and 
intensify the international cooperation within central banks and international 
financial organisations. 
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1. Introduction 
―Change we can believe in‖ (Obama, 2008). 
On 4 November 2008, Barack H. Obama was elected the 44th President of the 
United States. This was fated to be an epochal event. At the beginning of the 
elections, American voters considered there to be just one core discussion 
topic in this election: the Iraq war. However, as time passed, American 
encountered another unique topic: the financial crisis, the deepest global 
financial crisis since the Great Depression of 1929, which lasted until 1933. 
Even the most far-sighted politicians and financiers could not have forecasted 
that this financial crisis, which originated from the sub-prime loan crisis which 
started at the beginning of 2007, would so rapidly, widely and deeply influence 
the global economy, politics and even ideology. On this basis, Obama‘s 
―change‖ slogan hit the point; the future of the United States and the world was 
full of uncertainty. 
From the insolvency of Bear Stearns to the collapse of Lehman Brothers; from 
the CEOs‘ resignations from Merrill Lynch and Citigroup to the nationalisation 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; from the cooperative action of many central 
banks injecting the liquidity into the markets to Paulson‘s bailout plan, we 
review the whole process of this global financial crisis, and must ask the 
following questions: Why did Wall Street‘s high leverage model not work any 
longer? What kind of mistakes did the financial engineers make? Why did they 
design these complex derivative instruments? Does this crisis have any 
relationship to the global imbalances? What should governments and 
regulatory agencies do in order to prevent future crises?  
To answer these questions, we have to look back at the process of this global 
financial crisis to its beginnings then analyse the events during this period, and 
find out what caused it. To find out the causes of this global financial crisis we 
must inspect the weaknesses in our society, in our thinking and in our financial 
systems. This financial crisis is not the first crisis in human‘s history, and we do 
not expect it to be the last, but if we can find out the causes of mistakes which 
were recently made, it will provide us with a way to avoid the same problems in 
the future. This is important in order to improve the health of our financial 
system, and this therefore is the main purpose of this study. Thus, the job of 
this study is clear: to find out the causes of the global financial crisis, to point 
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out the weaknesses in our financial systems, and if possible, to provide the 
solution, or at least some suggestions towards a solution. 
2. Methodology 
A financial crisis is usually preceded by a major event or a series of events. 
These events can include a debt default, corporate bankruptcy, assets‘ price 
slumps, equity market collapses, currency crashes, etc. The current global 
financial crisis consisted of a series of events. If we can analyse each one, we 
can certainly find the reasons for the markets‘ falling. But this process would 
be tedious and unnecessary, because the global financial crisis consists of 
thousands of events and many of them have similar characteristics. So we 
need to choose some typical events which represent all of those which had the 
highest impact at the time. Through the analysis of these events, we will be 
more easily able to understand the causes of this crisis. 
For the purpose of choosing the most representative and significant events 
which we need to analyse, we use the following principles: 
Size: The impact of this event must have a considerable influence on the 
market. For example, if the event is a bankruptcy of a corporation, this 
corporation must be of considerable size and have an important position in its 
industry. 
Time: The event which is chosen must have occurred at a key point in time 
during the financial crisis, meaning that it is not a random event or a 
consequence of some other events. This event should happen at a key point in 
time during the global financial crisis.  
Representative: The cause of this event should be representative. The 
mistakes people made or the weakness of the financial systems which caused 
this event can represent other events during this financial crisis. 
This study uses academic research as a main source for doing the qualitative 
analysis; other information comes from financial journals and the internet. We 
also understand that even the most representative event still has minor 
differences with other events. So when we analyse the events, we will only 
focus on finding the general causes, rather than the events‘ unique 
characteristics. 
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3. Global Financial Crisis Overview 
The global financial crisis (GFC) is considered by many economists to be the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was triggered 
by ―a liquidity shortfall in the United States banking system‖ (Ivry, 2008) and 
has resulted in the collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks 
by national governments, and downturns in stock markets around the world. 
The GFC started to emerge in the spring of 2007. In the previous several years, 
the American housing market experienced a boom period and housing prices 
reached a peak in 2006. After that, housing prices declined, resulting in 
numerous evictions, foreclosures and prolonged vacancies, causing the value 
of mortgage-backed securities to fall. Many financial institutions who held 
these securities suffered large losses. In April of 2007, New Century Financial, 
the largest U.S. sub-prime lender, was bankrupt. This indicated the first crack 
in the Wall Street myth of the new financial innovation since 2001. In June, two 
Bear Stearns hedge fund insolvencies shocked the market. Two fund 
managers were accused for misleading investors. But soon the impact of this 
event exceeded personal lawsuits. The whole of Wall Street was blamed. In 
August, central banks around the world cooperated to inject funds into the 
financial markets, to try to solve the problem of the ―liquidity shortfall‖. But this 
did not stop the spreading plague. In the midst of the chaos, the world entered 
2008, an even more chaotic year. In January, global stock markets suffered 
big losses. On 21 January 2008 the FTSE 100 index fell 5.5 per cent. It was 
the biggest one-day loss since 11 September 2001. U.S. home prices 
continued to drop. They dropped 15.8 per cent in May; the steepest one-month 
drop since the index had been started eight years previously, eclipsing the 
15.3 per cent drop in April (Cox & Glapa, 2009:10). On September 7, the 
Federal Reserve nationalised Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac1. One week after 
this nationalisation, on September 15, Lehman Brothers applied for bankruptcy 
protection. The financial crisis had evolved to its apex. On 3 October 2008, U.S. 
President George W. Bush signed the Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act, 
creating a U.S. $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program to purchase failing 
bank assets. After a huge injection of funds into the markets the situation 
became stable in America, but the turmoil did not stop in the rest of the world. 
On 14 January 2009, Standard & Poor‘s (S&P) cut Greece‘s credit rating2 on 
debt, the GFC spread to Europe and the European debt crisis began. 
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To provide a more detailed description, we drew up Appendix A: Global 
Financial Crisis Impact Timeline. In this Appendix, we start at the year 2000 
and close at year 2009. We note details of important incidents in the United 
States and other countries, such as bankruptcies and takeovers, and give 
information and statistics about relevant trends. It also includes the United 
States and other countries‘ (major focus on U.S.) enactments of government 
laws and regulations, as well as public and private actions which affected the 
housing industry and related banking and investment activity. 
4. Events Analysis 
We chose the Bear Stearns event and the Lehman Brothers event for the 
event analysis. The reasons for choosing Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers 
are that they were substantial institutions and they had an important influence 
on the financial industry; additionally, the causes which made them fall are 
also the causes which made most of the other financial institutions fall. Finally, 
they failed at the key point of time in the process of this financial crisis. Bear 
Stearns fell in the mid 2007, which represents the beginning of GFC and its fall 
leads a series of companies‘ fall. Lehman Brothers fell in September, 2008 and 
heavily impacted global financial markets. Lehman Brothers‘ fall forced the 
largest banks in the world and many central banks to inject more funds into the 
markets to mitigate its negative effects.3 After that, when no more of the largest 
institutions fell, the global financial crisis became stable. So Lehman Brothers‘ 
fall indicated that the GFC reached its peak. 
4.1 The Bear Stearns Event 
Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. based in New York City, was a leading 
investment bank and provider of securities trading and brokerage. The main 
business included three principal areas: Capital Markets, Global Clearing 
Services, and Wealth Management. According to the net revenue distributions 
of 2006, capital markets (equities, fixed income, investment banking) 
comprised just under 80 per cent, wealth management comprised under 10 
per cent, and global clearing services, 12 per cent. 
Bear Stearns had grown significantly since 2000. In 2005-2007, Bear Stearns 
was recognised as the ―most admired‖ securities firm in Fortune‘s ―America‘s 
Most Admired Companies‖ survey, and was second overall in the securities 
firm section. The annual survey is a prestigious ranking of employee talent, 
quality of risk management and business innovation. This was the second time 
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in three years that Bear Stearns had achieved this top distinction. As of 30 
November 2006, the company had a total capital of approximately U.S. $66.7 
billion and total assets of U.S. $350.4 billion. According to the April 2005 issue 
of Institutional Investor magazine, Bear Stearns was the seventh-largest 
securities firm in terms of total capital. 
On 7 June 2007, Bear Stearns informed investors that in two of its funds, the 
High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund (HGELF) 
and the High-Grade Structured Credit Fund (HGF) it was halting redemptions 
because of liquidity problems. HGELF had lost 23 per cent of its value since 
January 2007, including almost 19 per cent in April alone (Cox & Glapa, 
2009:2).  
On 22 June 2007, Bear Stearns pledged a collateralised loan of up to U.S. 
$3.2 billion to ―bail out‖ HGF, while negotiating with other banks to loan money 
against collateral to HGELF. Bear Stearns had originally put up just U.S. $35 
million, so they were hesitant about the bailout, and CEO James Cayne and 
other senior executives worried about the damage to the company‘s reputation 
(Bajaj & Creswell, 2007). These two funds were invested in thinly traded 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) 4. Merrill Lynch seized U.S. $850 million 
worth of the underlying collateral which was pledged by Bear Stearns but was 
only able to auction off U.S. $100 million of it. The incident sparked concern of 
contagion, as Bear Stearns might be forced to liquidate its CDOs, prompting a 
mark-down of similar assets in other portfolios (Siew & Yoon, 2007; Pittman, 
2007). During the week of 16 July 2007, Bear Stearns disclosed that two of 
their sub-prime hedge funds had lost nearly all of their value amid a rapid 
decline in the market for sub-prime mortgages. 
On 1 August 2007, investors in the two funds took action against Bear Stearns 
and its top board and risk management managers and officers. This was the 
first legal action made against Bear Stearns, though there have been several 
others since. 
On 14 March 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York agreed to provide 
a U.S. $25 billion loan to Bear Stearns, collateralised by free and clear assets 
from Bear Stearns, in order to provide it with the liquidity for up to 28 days that 
the market was refusing to provide. Apparently, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York then had a change of heart and told Bear Stearns that the 28-day 
loan was unavailable to them. The deal was then changed to one where the 
6 
 
NY Fed would make a US$30 billion loan to JP Morgan (collaterallised not by 
any JP Morgan assets but by Bear Stearns‘ assets), who would then buy Bear 
Stearns for US$2 per share (Barr & Morcroff, 2008). Two days later, on 16 
March 2008, Bear Stearns signed a merger agreement with JP Morgan Chase 
in a stock swap worth US$2 a share, or less than 7 per cent of Bear Stearns‘ 
market value just two days before (Onaran, 2008). This sale price represented 
a staggering loss, as its stock had traded at US$172 a share as late as 
January 2007 and US$93 a share as late as February 2008.  
On 24 March 2008, a class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of Bear Stearns‘ 
shareholders, challenging the terms of JP Morgan‘s recently announced 
acquisition of Bear Stearns. That same day a new agreement was reached 
that raised JP Morgan Chase‘s offer to US$10 a share, up from the initial US$2 
offer, which meant an offer of US$1.2 billion (Dash & Thomas, 2008). The 
revised deal was aimed to quiet upset investors and any subsequent legal 
action brought against JP Morgan Chase as a result of the deal, as well as to 
prevent Bear Stearns‘ employees, many of whose past compensation had 
consisted of Bear Stearns stock, from leaving for other firms. On 29 May, Bear 
Stearns shareholders approved the sale to JP Morgan Chase at the US$10 
per share price (White, 2008).  
4.2 The Lehman Brothers Event 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was a global financial services firm (4th largest 
investment bank in the U.S. behind Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and 
Merrill Lynch) with businesses in investment banking, equity and fixed-income 
sales, research and trading, investment management, private equity and 
private banking. It was a primary dealer in the U.S. Treasury securities market.  
In August 2007, Lehman Brothers closed its sub-prime lender, BNC Mortgage, 
eliminating 1,200 positions in 23 locations, and took an after-tax charge of 
US$25 million and a US$27 million reduction in goodwill. Lehman announced 
that poor market conditions in the mortgage space ―necessitated a substantial 
reduction in its resources and capacity in the sub-prime space‖ (Kulikowski, 
2007). 
In 2008, Lehman faced an unprecedented loss due to the continuing sub-prime 
mortgage crisis. Lehman‘s loss was a result of having held onto large positions 
in sub-prime and other lower-rated mortgage tranches when securing the 
underlying mortgages. In many events, huge losses accrued in lower-rated 
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mortgage-backed securities throughout 2008. Anderson and Dash (2008) 
show that in the second fiscal quarter, Lehman reported losses of US$2.8 
billion and was forced to sell off US$6 billion in assets; in the first half of 2008 
alone, Lehman stock lost 73 per cent of its value as the credit market 
continued to tighten; in August 2008, Lehman reported that it intended to 
release 6 per cent of its work force, 1,500 people, just ahead of its 
third-quarter-reporting deadline in September. 
Investor confidence continued to erode as Lehman‘s stock lost roughly half its 
value and pushed the S&P 500 down 3.4 per cent on September 9. The Dow 
Jones lost 300 points the same day on investors‘ concerns about the security 
of the bank (Times-Picayune, 2008). The U.S. government did not announce 
any plans to assist Lehman (Anderson & White, 2008). The next day, Lehman 
announced a loss of US$3.9 billion and their intent to sell off a majority stake in 
their investment-management business (Bruno, 2008; White, 2008). The stock 
slid seven per cent that day (Bruno, 2008). Lehman, after earlier rejecting 
questions on the sale of the company, was reportedly searching for a buyer as 
its stock price dropped another 40 per cent on 11 September 2008 (Anderson, 
2008). 
On Saturday, 13 September 2008, Timothy F. Geithner, the president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York called a meeting on the future of Lehman 
Brothers, which included the possibility of an emergency liquidation of its 
assets (Anderson, Andrews, Bajaj & Dash, 2008). Lehman reported that it had 
been in talks with Bank of America and Barclays for the company‘s possible 
sale. However, both Barclays and Bank of America ultimately declined to 
purchase the entire company (Anderson & White, 2008). 
On Monday, 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings announced it 
would file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, citing bank debt of US$613 
billion, US$155 billion in bond debt, and assets worth US$639 billion. The filing 
marked the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history (Mamudi, 2008). 
5. The Causes of the Global Financial Crisis 
When we look back on the fall of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, we find 
that Bear Stearns was troubled by the CDOs and Lehman Brothers was highly 
involved in the mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). During the crisis, the 
prices of CDOs and MBSs crashed and finally, the huge losses on these 
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assets destroyed Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. CDOs and MBSs have 
similar characteristics; they are both the products of securitisation. 
5.1 Securitisation 
Securitisation is a structured finance process. It involves lumping together 
large numbers of individual financial instruments such as mortgages, and then 
slicing and dicing them into different pieces that appeal to different types of 
investors (Jones, 2009:7). Securitisation is an innovation in the financial 
industry. It can transform an illiquid asset, or group of assets into a security 
with higher liquidity. 
We use the mortgage-backed security (MBS) as an example. MBSs are a type 
of asset-backed security that is secured by a collection of mortgages. The 
process works as follows: 
First, a regulated and authorised financial institution originates numerous 
mortgages, which are secured by claims against the various properties the 
mortgagors purchase. Then, all of the individual mortgages are bundled 
together into a mortgage pool, which is held in trust as the collateral for an 
MBS. MBSs can be issued by a third-party financial company, such as a large 
investment banking firm, or by the same bank that originated the mortgages in 
the first place. Mortgage-backed securities are also issued by aggregators 
such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in the U.S. 
Regardless, the result is the same: a new security is created, backed up by the 
claims against the mortgagors' assets. This security can be sold to participants 
in the secondary mortgage market. This market is extremely large, providing a 
significant amount of liquidity to the group of mortgages, which otherwise 
would have been quite illiquid on their own.  
Furthermore, at the time the MBS is being created, the issuer will often choose 
to break the mortgage pool into a number of different parts, referred to 
as tranches. These tranches can be structured in virtually any way the issuer 
sees fit, allowing the issuer to tailor a single MBS for a variety of risk 
tolerances. Pension funds will typically invest in high-credit rated 
mortgage-backed securities, while hedge funds will seek higher returns by 
investing in those with lower credit ratings (Investopedia, 2010).  
The benefit of this securitisation is straightforward. It breaks the limitation of 
the traditional mortgage mode. In a traditional mortgage loan, a bank 
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organises a loan to the borrower/homeowner and normally has to hold this 
mortgage loan until its maturity because the mortgage asset is illiquid and 
difficult to be traded. With the advent of securitisation, however, the bank no 
longer needs to hold it to maturity but can sell the mortgages and distribute 
credit risk to investors through the MBS. By selling the mortgages to other 
investors, the origination banks replenished their funds, enabling them to issue 
more loans and generating transaction fees. As with the advantages of 
securitisation, the disadvantages are also obvious. An investor, who had no 
chance of touching the risky mortgage assets before, can now hold a huge 
amount of them. The risk is spread worldwide through securitisation. For 
example, an Indian investor who has never been to America can have an MBS 
with some real estate in California as back assets. Certainly, the wealth of this 
Indian investor is now exposed to the prices of these houses which he never 
saw. By selling MBSs to different investors, financial institutions received new 
funds which could be reinvested into the U.S. real estate market. Thus, a 
continuous money-making circular process is created. With the great profit 
margins and commissions, these financial institutions further impulse the 
circulation of this process. 
Securitisation accelerated in the mid-1990s. The total amount of 
mortgage-backed securities issued in the U.S. almost tripled between 1996 
and 2007, to $7.3 trillion. The securitised share of sub-prime mortgages (i.e., 
those passed to third-party investors via MBSs) increased from 54 per cent in 
2001, to 75 per cent in 2006 (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2008). American 
homeowners, consumers, and corporations owed roughly $25 trillion during 
2008. American banks retained about $8 trillion of that total directly as 
traditional mortgage loans. Bondholders and other traditional lenders provided 
another $7 trillion. The remaining $10 trillion came from the securitisation 
markets. The securitisation markets started to close down in the spring of 2007 
and nearly shut down in the autumn of 2008. More than a third of the private 
credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds (Baily & Elliott, 
2009). This process is showed in Figure 5.1. 
With the development of securitisation, a new door for seeking profit was 
opening for financial institutions. Under the pressure of having to earn more 
money, these financial institutions grasped the opportunity to sell those assets 
which had been difficult to sell without securitisation. And they also borrowed 
new money to seek new assets. Inevitably, this process brought these financial 
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institutions new income, but also brought an unforeseen increase to the 
leverage.  
 
Figure 5.1 Securitisation Market Activity 
Sources: Mark Zandi, The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis, 
2010-01-13 
Williams (2010:49) refers to leverage as ―borrowing funds to invest in pursuit of 
greater profits than could be had with a firm‘s own capital and reflects how 
much debt a firm is comfortable with as it pursues profit‖. The amount of 
leverage a firm takes is a risk management decision made by the board and 
senior management and helps define the firm‘s risk tolerance. Williams 
(2010:49) also states: In good times, higher leverage generates higher profit, 
and in bad times, leverage can kill. For example, a 5 per cent return on US$1 
billion of assets is US$50 million. However, if an investment firm decides to 
add US$1 billion in borrowing, excluding interest cost, the same 5 per cent 
return magically doubles to US$100 million. In this example, profits were not 
increased by better investments, but by greater leverage risk. 
As of 30 November 2007, Bear Stearns had notional contract amounts of 
approximately US$13.4 trillion in derivative financial instruments, of which 
US$1.85 trillion were listed futures and option contracts. In addition, Bear 
Stearns was carrying more than US$28 billion in ―level 3‖ assets on its books 
at the end of fiscal 2007 versus a net equity position of only US$11.1 billion. 
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This US$11.1 billion supported US$395 billion in assets (Boyd, 2008) which 
means a leverage ratio of 35.5 to 1. High leverage was also used by Lehman 
Brothers. Lehman Brothers‘ annual financial statements of 2007 showed an 
accounting leverage of 30.7 times (US$691 billion in assets divided by US$22 
billion in stockholders‘ equity). While generating tremendous profits during the 
boom, this vulnerable position meant that just a 3-4 per cent decline in the 
value of its assets would entirely eliminate its book value or equity (Blackburn, 
2008). Figure 5.2 shows the increased leverage ratios of the five biggest U.S. 
investment banks from 2003-2007. 
 
Figure 5.2 Leverage Ratios for Major Investment Banks 
Source Data: Company Annual Reports (SEC Form10k) 
Notes: The leverage ratio is a measure of the risk taken by a firm; a higher 
ratio indicates more risk. It is calculated as total debt divided by stockholders 
equity. Each firm‘s ratio increased during 2003-2007. 
 
5.2 U.S. Housing Bubble 
The boom of the U.S. mortgage-backed security market could not have existed 
without the boom of the U.S. housing market. Between 1997 and 2006, the 
price of a typical American house increased by 124 per cent. During the two 
decades ending in 2001, the national median home price ranged from 2.9 to 
3.1 times median household income. This ratio rose to 4.0 in 2004 and 4.6 in 
2006. Figure 5.3 shows the median and average sales prices of new homes 
sold in the U.S. in from 1963 to 2007. 
12 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Median and Average Sales Prices of New Homes Sold in 
United States 1963-2008 Annual Data 
Sources: Wikipedia, United States Census Bureau, Median and Average Sales 
Prices of New Homes Sold in United States 1963-2008 Annual Data, 
2010-01-04 
Finding it easier to get credit than ever before and expecting higher housing 
prices in the future, many Americans started searching for their own dream 
houses. The USA home ownership rate increased from 64 per cent in 1994 
(about where it had been since 1980) to an all-time high of 69.2 per cent in 
2004. The increased home ownership rate further pushed up house prices.  
The soaring housing prices in the U.S. can be ascribed to two factors: 1. the 
domestic factor: low interest rates and dangerous financial tools; 2. the 
international factor: huge inflows of foreign funds. 
5.2.1 Low interest rates and dangerous financial tools 
The lowering of interest rates had started in 2001, when the Federal Reserve 
(FED) decided to lower the interest rate to 1 per cent, in order overcome the 
negative effects of September 11 on the growth of the economy. Under this 
situation, financial investors represented by investment banks and Wall Street 
companies were looking for a solid return on their investment beyond the Fed‘s 
one per cent interest rate. They capitalised on the opportunity presented by the 
growing mortgage market in the U.S. Under the pressure of seeking new 
income, these financial institutions gradually downgraded the qualification 
requirements of debtors for the new loans. Many debtors who would not have 
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qualified for loans, according to the old requirements, now got the money to 
purchase their new houses. These debtors are called sub-prime borrowers. 
Typically, sub-prime borrowers have weak credit histories and reduced 
repayment capacity. Sub-prime loans have a higher risk of default than loans 
to prime borrowers.  
The value of American sub-prime mortgages was estimated at $1.3 trillion as 
of March 2007, with over 7.5 million first-lien sub-prime mortgages outstanding. 
(The first-lien here refers to a lender in the first or priority position to benefit 
from any liquidation of the collateral which secures the loan, in the event that 
the loan is in default and the property is to be sold. An example of a first-lien 
position would be the bank which holds the original mortgage on a property. 
The term ―first-lien sub-prime mortgage holder‖ refers to the lender who retains 
the first-lien position in this sub-prime mortgage). Between 2004 and 2006 the 
share of sub-prime mortgages relative to total originations ranged from 18 – 21 
per cent, versus less than 10 per cent in 2001-2003 and during 2007. (Perry, 
2008) See Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4 U.S. Sub-prime Lending Expanded Significantly 2004-2006 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; Harvard University – State of the Nation‘s 
Housing Report 2008 
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Besides the downgraded loan qualifications, some new dangerous financial 
tools were created, which further increased the vulnerability of the financial 
system. The adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) is an example. These mortgages 
enticed borrowers with a below-market interest rate for some predetermined 
period, followed by market interest rates for the remainder of the mortgage‘s 
term. Borrowers who could not make the higher payments once the initial 
grace period ended would try to refinance their mortgages. Under this situation, 
if the housing prices keep going up, borrowers will get more money by 
refinance their mortgages to pay the increasing interest. But the total amount 
of money which they borrowed increased and thus the total risks increased. 
5.2.2 Huge inflows of foreign funds 
The huge inflows of foreign funds to the U.S. provided abundant credit and 
pushed up the U.S. housing prices. This huge inflow of foreign funds was the 
result of the vast U.S. trade imbalance. Between 1996 and 2004 the U.S. 
current account deficit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5 per cent to 5.8 per 
cent of GDP. Figure 5.5 describes this change. 
 
Figure 5.5 U.S. Current Account or Trade Deficit: Dollars and % GDP 
Source Data: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
According to the balance of payments identity, a country (such as the U.S.) 
running a current account deficit needs to have a capital account (investment) 
surplus of the same amount. This is exactly what occurred in the U.S. 
economy. A great deal of foreign investment, mainly from the emerging 
economies in Asia and the oil-exporting nations, swarmed into the U.S. After 
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the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Asian countries realised that they needed to 
establish a large foreign currency reserve against the next financial crisis. The 
U.S. dollar was chosen as their main reserve currency. With the huge amount 
of goods exported to the U.S. and Europe, the official U.S. dollar reserves, as 
well as private savings which are denominated in U.S. dollars in these Asian 
countries, increased dramatically. At the same time, the soaring oil price 
brought the oil-exporting nations billions of U.S. dollars as well. Of course, 
these U.S. dollars would not remain as cash in the hands of these 
governments. Most of these U.S. dollars went back to America to buy the 
safest assets in the world: U.S. treasury bonds. For example, at the end of 
June 2010, official foreign currency reserves in China amounted to more than 
U.S. $2 trillion, approximately half of it denominated in U.S. dollars. And with 
this US$1 trillion, the Chinese government bought about US$800 billion U.S. 
treasury bonds. Ben Bernanke referred to this as a ―saving glut‖ (Bernanke, 
2007). Following this huge foreign investment the U.S. had been changed from 
a net foreign investment country to a negative foreign investment country. See 
Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6 U.S.A. Net International Investment Position 
Sources: Elena L. Nguyen, The International Investment Position of the United 
States at Yearend 2007, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, July 2008 
The huge amount of U.S. treasury bonds bought by foreign governments 
effectively relieved the tight condition of the U.S. capital market. It prevented 
long-term interest rates from going up and even, to a large extent, eliminated 
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the Fed‘s endeavour to tighten the capital market. If not for these foreign 
investors, it would have been the American people who would have absorbed 
all the U.S. treasury bonds. Lower interest rates encourage borrowing and thus 
this flood of foreign funds indirectly helped the U.S. housing market to keep 
booming. 
But ―a bubble is not indefinitely sustainable‖ (Shiller, 2001). The credit and 
price explosion led to a new house-building explosion which eventually led to a 
surplus of housing supply. And to prevent overheating of the economy, the Fed 
raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This 
contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage 
(ARM) rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for 
homeowners. U.S. housing prices then began to decline, after having peaked 
in mid-2006.  
Following the drop of U.S. housing prices and the interest rates reset, ARM 
borrowers found it more difficult to refinance their mortgages. The foreclosure 
rate increased. Foreclosure refers to the process whereby the lender may take 
possession of the property if a borrower is delinquent in making timely 
mortgage payments to the loan servicer (a bank or other financial institution). 
In the third quarter of 2007, sub-prime ARMs, making up only 6.8 per cent of 
U.S. mortgages outstanding, also accounted for 43 per cent of the foreclosures 
which began during that quarter. By October 2007, approximately 16 per cent 
of sub-prime ARMs were either 90-days delinquent or the lender had begun 
foreclosure proceedings; roughly triple the rate of 2005. By January 2008, the 
delinquency rate had risen to 21 per cent and by May 2008 it was 25 per cent 
(Bernanke, 2008). 
The value of all outstanding residential mortgages owed by U.S. households in 
the purchase of residences housing at most four families was US$9.9 trillion as 
of year-end 2006, and US$10.6 trillion as of midyear 2008. During 2007, 
lenders had begun foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 
79 per cent increase over 2006. This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81 
per cent increase vs. 2007, and again to 2.8 million in 2009, a 21 per cent 
increase vs. 2008. By August 2008, 9.2 per cent of all U.S. mortgages 
outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By September 2009, this 
had risen to 14.4 per cent. Between August 2007 and October 2008, there 
were 936,439 U.S. residences under foreclosure (Clifford, 2008). 
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As more borrowers stopped paying their mortgage payments (this became an 
ongoing crisis) foreclosures and the supply of homes for sale increased. This 
placed downward pressure on housing prices and by September 2008, 
average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20 per cent from their 
mid-2006 peak. This major and unexpected decline in house price meant that 
many borrowers had zero or negative equity in their homes, resulting in their 
homes being worth less than their mortgages. As of March 2008, an estimated 
8.8 million borrowers — 10.8 per cent of all homeowners — had negative 
equity in their homes, a number that is believed to have risen to 12 million by 
November 2008. Borrowers in this situation have an incentive to default on 
their mortgages (Andrews & Uchitelle, 2008). Economist Stan Leibowitz (2009) 
argued in the Wall Street Journal that although only 12 per cent of homes had 
negative equity, they comprised 47 per cent of foreclosures during the second 
half of 2008. He concluded that the extent of equity in the home was the key 
factor in foreclosure, rather than the type of loan, credit-worthiness of the 
borrower, or ability to pay.  
A decline in mortgage payments will definitely reduce the value of 
mortgage-backed securities, and then erode the net worth and financial health 
of banks which hold these MBSs. Investors lose confidence in the banks once 
they hear that their banks hold such large amounts of ―toxic assets‖ and they 
then withdraw their deposits from the banks. Under pressure, the banks will 
start to sell these problematic assets. But once all banks start to sell at the 
same time, they will be hit by a ―fire sale‖ situation. All banks selling similar 
assets will cause the prices of these assets to drop quickly, thus further 
destroying the investors‘ confidence, and further causing banks to have to sell 
more assets. Feldstein (2008) pointed out that ―this vicious cycle is at the heart 
of the crisis‖. 
In a ―fire sale‖ situation, banks will not only suffer a very low selling price, but 
also face the danger that they cannot sell their assets at all, like the problems 
of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) found that 
different banks often hold broadly similar portfolios of assets, and if all banks 
try to sell at the same time, the market can dry up completely. Assets that are 
relatively liquid during normal times can suddenly become highly illiquid just 
when the bank most needs them. Thus, even if the bank would be completely 
solvent absent a run, its balance sheet may be destroyed by having to liquidate 
assets at ―fire sale‖ prices. 
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5.3 Shadow Banking System 
Compared to other businesses, banks are more vulnerable to failure (and 
abuse), and the consequences of failure exert a large impact on the economy. 
Thus banks are required to maintain a fraction of their deposits in the form of 
cash and other reserves (CFA Institute, 2006). This is called the fractional 
reserve banking system. But capital is costly, even if it is only a fraction.  
To avoid this cost (required deposits have to be deposited with central banks 
as an insurance, so cannot fully be used by banks, thus these banks see this 
required deposit as a cost) bankers try to circumvent the regulation by either 
hiding risk or by moving some leverage outside the bank. In fact, the decrease 
in the leverage ratio of commercial banks was accompanied by an increase in 
the leverage ratios of non-banking financial institutions (see the dotted and 
dashed lines in Figure 5.7) (UNCTAD, 2009:13). This shift of leverage created 
a ―Shadow Banking System‖. 
 
Figure 5.7 Leverages of Top 10 United States Financial Firms by Sector 
Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on balance sheet data from 
Thomson Datastream. 
Note: Leverage ratio measured as share of shareholders equity over total 
assets. Data refers to 4-quarter moving average. 
The shadow banking system consists of non-depository banks and other 
financial entities (e.g., investment banks, hedge funds, and money market 
funds). By definition, shadow institutions do not accept deposits like a 
depository bank and therefore are not subject to the same regulations. Familiar 
examples of shadow institutions include Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. 
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Other complex legal entities comprising the system include hedge funds, 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs), conduits, money funds, investment 
banks, and other non-banking financial institutions. 
Shadow banking institutions are typically intermediaries between investors and 
borrowers. For example, an institutional investor like a pension fund may be 
willing to lend money, while a corporation may be searching for funds to 
borrow. The shadow banking institution will channel funds from the investors to 
the corporation, profiting either from fees or from the difference in interest rates 
between what it pays the investors and what it receives from the borrower. 
Many shadow bank-like institutions and vehicles have emerged in American 
and European markets and have grown dramatically since the year 2000, 
when they started to play an important role in providing credit across the global 
financial system. At its peak, the shadow banking system in the United States 
held assets of more than US$16 trillion, about US$4 trillion more than 
regulated deposit-taking banks, see Figure 5.8 (UNCTAD, 2009:13). 
 
Figure 5.8 The Shadow Banking System, 2007, Q2 
Source: Shin (2009), UNCTAD, The Global Economic Crisis: Systemic 
Failures and Multilateral Remedies, 2009. 
Shadow institutions are not subject to the same safety and soundness 
regulations as depository banks, meaning that they do not have to keep as 
much money in the proverbial vault relative to what they borrow and lend. In 
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other words, they can have a very high level of financial leverage, with a high 
ratio of debt relative to the liquid assets available to pay immediate claims. 
High leverage magnifies profits during boom periods and losses during 
downturns.  
At the beginning, regulators did not seem to be too worried about this problem 
because they assumed that, unlike deposit-taking banks, the collapse of large 
non-banking institutions would not have systemic implications. The working 
hypothesis was that securitisation had contributed to both diversifying and 
allocating risk to sophisticated economic agents who could bear such risk. As 
a consequence, the system could now take a higher level of total risk 
(UNCTAD, 2009:14). But they forgot that the shadow institutions had grown 
even bigger than the deposit-taking banks at that time. 
The current regulatory framework also assumed that policies aimed at 
guaranteeing the soundness of individual banks could also guarantee the 
soundness of the whole banking system (Nugee & Persaud, 2006). It was 
micro-prudential but not macro-prudential. This proved to be problematic 
because there were instances in which what was prudent for an individual 
institution had negative systemic implications. Consider the case of a bank that 
suffers large losses on some of its loans. The prudent choice for this bank is to 
reduce its lending activities and cut its assets to a level which is in line with its 
smaller capital base. If the bank in question is small, the system will have no 
problem in absorbing this reduction in lending. If, however, the bank in 
question is large, or the losses affect several banks at the same time, the 
individual bank‘s attempt to rebuild its capital base will drain liquidity from the 
system. Less lending by some banks will translate into less funding to other 
banks, which, if other sources of liquidity are not found, might be forced to cut 
lending and thus amplify the de-leveraging process and affect investment in 
fixed capital (UNCTAD, 2009:16). 
The shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and 
nearly shut-down completely in the autumn of 2008. More than a third of the 
private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds (Gelinas, 
2009). Paul Krugman, laureate of the Nobel Prize in Economics, described the 
run on the shadow banking system as the ―core of what happened‖ to cause 
the crisis. ―As the shadow banking system expanded to rival or even surpass 
conventional banking in importance, politicians and government officials 
should have realised that they were recreating the kind of financial vulnerability 
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that made the Great Depression possible and they should have responded by 
extending regulations and the financial safety net to cover these new 
institutions. Influential figures should have proclaimed a simple rule: anything 
that does what a bank does, anything that has to be rescued in crises the way 
banks are, should be regulated like a bank.‖ He referred to this lack of control 
as ―malign neglect‖ (Krugman, 2009). 
6. Conclusion 
We can now conclude what the causes of this global financial crisis were: 
under the stimulation of seeking more profit, financial institutions expanded to 
an unreasoned credit size by using the shadow banking system and then 
induced and amplified the housing bubble. At the same time, the risks spread 
across the world through the process of securitisation. Finally, the housing 
bubble burst, and a worldwide financial crisis became inevitable. 
On 15 November 2008, leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) summarised the 
following causes of the Global Financial Crisis: “During a period of strong 
global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged stability earlier this decade, 
market participants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of 
the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time, weak 
underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly 
complex and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage 
combined to create vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and 
supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and 
address the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial 
innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic 
regulatory actions” (G20, 2008). 
This crisis has shown that macroeconomists and central bankers knew less 
than they thought they did. And regulatory shortcomings have clearly been a 
key contributory factor to the global financial crisis (Claessens, Dell‘Ariccia, 
Igan & Laeven, 2010). So it requires us to redesign the macroeconomic policy 
framework and implement the lessons learned from the crisis. 
We suggest that the central bank or the national financial supervisor should 
intensify market regulation and supervision. Dehesa (2007) found that half of 
the sub-prime mortgage originators are agents and brokers and that they are 
not part of a banking group; thus, they fall outside federal banking regulation. 
Moreover, these agents and brokers get paid by commissions based on the 
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number of mortgage loans that they are able to sell to households, so their 
incentives have nothing to do with the default risk involved in the loan. On the 
contrary, the borrower who has higher risk is more difficult to find the buyer, so 
the borrower is more willing to pay the larger commission to these agents and 
brokers. The other half of the originators are the banks which, some time ago 
tended to hold the mortgages for some years on their books, so as to have an 
incentive to be aware of the risk of non-performing mortgages. But today, both 
brokers and banks which originate these loans sell them very quickly, either 
directly or through another financial intermediary, which then securitises and 
sells them to investors, thus losing their traditional incentive to monitor their 
risk.  
To solve this problem, banking authorities should regulate all the agents and 
brokers as they regulate the banks. All financial institutions should be 
supervised on a fully consolidated basis. All markets and providers of financial 
products should be overseen on the basis of the risk they produce. If an 
investment bank issues insurance contracts like CDS, this activity should be 
subject to the same regulation that applies to insurance companies. If an 
insurance company is involved in maturity transformation, it should be 
regulated like a bank (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009). The policy 
makers can also set an explicit leverage ratio bound to restrain growth of 
leverage within financial institutions. 
We also found that although some risk-hungry investors who were ready to 
invest in higher-risk-higher-yield financial products like CDOs, encountered the 
problem that they were not able to fully understand them before purchasing 
them, because these products were so complex. Thus the banks and financial 
institutions, which structure and securitise these loans, should be extremely 
transparent about their package processes, their supporting models and their 
associated risks (Dehesa, 2007). The rating agencies should also show that 
they are truly independent and that their rating process is fully transparent and 
reliable, mainly for these complex structured products. 
Central banks and national regulatory authorities around the world should 
intensify their coordination and communication by reviewing and aligning their 
global accounting standards; strengthening transparency of credit derivatives 
markets and reducing their systemic risk (Nanto, 2009). All systemically 
important financial institutions should be subject to an appropriate degree of 
regulation. Use of stress-testing by financial institutions should be more 
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rigorous. Large complex systemically-important financial institutions should be 
subject to more stringent capital regulation than other firms. Capital decisions 
by regulators and firms should make greater provision against liquidity risk. 
Hedge funds should be required to register with a national securities regulator 
and provide information on a confidential basis to regulators about their 
strategies and positions (Nanto, 2009). Minimum international standards – a 
regulatory floor – should apply in all countries, including tax havens and 
offshore banking centers to avoid regulatory arbitrage. 
Central banks and some international financial organisations like the IMF 
should work more closely to intensify international capital regulation. They 
should dynamically monitor international financial markets and observe new 
tendencies of financial innovation. The WTO should play a more active role in 
balancing global trade; encourage balanced developments in different 
countries and then mitigate trade imbalances amongst those countries. 
All these tasks are not easy and will take a long time to achieve. But if we could 
realise all these targets, our financial systems would become healthier and a 
new financial crisis would be less likely to occur. This would be part of Barack 
Obama‘s ―change‖ that we can then really believe. 
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Appendix A 
Global Financial Crisis Impact Timeline 
2000-2003: Early 2000s recession spurs government action to rev up 
economy. 
2000-2001: US Federal Reserve lowers Federal funds rate 11 times, from 6.5 
per cent (May 2000) to 1.75 per cent (December 2001), creating an easy-credit 
environment that fueled the growth of US subprime mortgages. 
2002-2006: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac combined purchases of incorrectly 
rated AAA subprime mortgage-backed securities rise from U.S. $38 billion to 
U.S. $90 billion per year. 
 Lenders began to offer loans to higher-risk borrowers; Subprime mortgages 
amounted to U.S. $600 billion (20 per cent) by 2006. 
 Speculation in residential real estate rose. During 2005, 28 per cent of 
homes purchased were for investment purposes, with an additional 12 per 
cent purchased as vacation homes. During 2006, these figures were 22 per 
cent and 14 per cent, respectively. As many as 85 per cent of condominium 
properties purchased in Miami were for investment purposes which the 
owners resold without the seller ever having lived in them. 
2002-2003: Mortgage denial rate of 14 per cent for conventional home 
purchase loans, half of 1997. 
2002: Annual home price appreciation of 10 per cent or more in California, 
Florida, and most Northeastern states. 
 June 17: President G.W. Bush sets goal of increasing minority home 
owners by at least 5.5 million by 2010 through billions of dollars in tax 
credits, subsidies and a Fannie Mae commitment of U.S. $440 billion to 
establish NeighborWorks America with faith based organizations. 
2003: Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan lowers Federal Reserve‘s key 
interest rate to 1 per cent, the lowest in 45 years. 
 August: Borio and White of Bank of International Settlements speak at the 
Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, referencing BIS‘s ―Credit Risk 
Transfer‖ 2003 report which warned about problems with collateralized 
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debt obligations4 and rating agencies. Their arguments are rejected or 
ignored by attendees, including Alan Greenspan. 
 September: Bush administration recommended moving governmental 
supervision of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under a new agency created 
within the Department of the Treasury. The changes are blocked by 
Congress. 
2003-2007: U.S. subprime mortgages increased 292 per cent, from U.S. $332 
billion to U.S. $1.3 trillion, due primarily to the private sector entering the 
mortgage bond market, once an almost exclusive domain of government 
sponsored enterprises like Freddie Mac. 
 The Federal Reserve fails to use its supervisory and regulatory authority 
over banks, mortgage underwriters and other lenders, who abandoned loan 
standards (employment history, income, down payments, credit rating, 
assets, property loan-to-value ratio and debt-servicing ability), emphasizing 
instead lender‘s ability to securitize and repackage subprime loans. 
2004-2007: Many financial institutions issued large amounts of debt and 
invested in mortgage-backed securities5 (MBS), believing that house prices 
would continue to rise and that households would keep up on mortgage 
payments. 
2004: U.S. homeownership rate peaks with an all time high of 69.2 per cent. 
 Following the example of Countrywide Financial, the largest U.S. mortgage 
lender, many lenders adopt automated loan approvals that critics argued 
were not subjected to appropriate review and documentation according to 
good mortgage underwriting standards. In 2007, 40 per cent of all subprime 
loans resulted from automated underwriting. Mortgage fraud by borrowers 
increases. 
 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) ratcheted up 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac affordable-housing goals for next four years, 
from 50 per cent to 56 per cent, stating they lagged behind the private 
market; they purchased U.S. $175 billion in 2004—44 per cent of the 
market; From 2004 to 2006, they purchased U.S. $434 billion in securities 
backed by subprime loans.6 
 October: SEC effectively suspends net capital rule for five firms — 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and 
Morgan Stanley. Freed from government imposed limits on the debt they 
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can assume, they levered up 20, 30 and even 40 to 1, buying massive 
amounts of mortgage-backed securities and other risky investments. 
2005:  
 The Securities and Exchange Commission ceases an investigation of Bear 
Stearns ―pricing, valuation, and analysis‖ of mortgage-backed collateralized 
debt obligations. No action is taken against Bear. 
 Robert Shiller gives talks warning about a housing bubble to the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. He is ignored, and would later call it an incidence of 
Groupthink. That same year, his second edition of ―Irrational Exuberance‖ 
warns that the housing bubble might lead to a worldwide recession. 
January: 
 Federal Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich raises concerns over 
subprime lending practices, says mortgage brokers might not have 
incentives for careful underwriting and that that portion of the subprime 
industry was veering close to a breakdown, that it‘s possible that it is a 
bubble but that the housing market did not qualify for specific monetary 
policy treatment at this point. 
 The Bank of International Settlements warns about the problems with 
structured financial products, and points out the conflict of interest of credit 
rating agencies – that they are being paid by the same companies they are 
supposed to be objectively evaluating. 
February: The Office of Thrift Supervision implements new rules that allow 
savings and loans with over U.S. $1 billion in assets to meet their CRA7 
obligations without investing in local communities, cutting availability of 
subprime loans. 
June: The International Swaps and Derivatives Association enables credit 
default swaps8 (quasi-insurance contracts) to be taken out against 
asset-backed security collateralized debt obligations (including ones backed 
by subprime mortgages). 
August: Raghuram Rajan delivers his paper ―Has Financial Development 
Made the World Riskier?‖ warning about credit default swaps, at the Jackson 
Hole Economic Symposium. His arguments are rejected by attendees, 
including Alan Greenspan, Donald Kohn, and Lawrence Summer. 
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September: The Mortgage insurance companies of America send a letter to 
the Federal Reserve, warning about ―risky lending practices‘ on US real estate. 
Fall 2005: Booming housing market halt abruptly, from the fourth quarter of 
2005 to the first quarter of 2006, median prices nationwide drop 3.3 per cent. 
2006: 
 May: The subprime lender Ameriquest announces it will cut 3,800 Jobs, 
close its 229 retail branches and rely instead on the Web. 
 May 5: Merit Financial Inc, based in Kirkland, Washington, files for 
bankruptcy and closes its doors, firing all but 80 of its 410 employees; 
Merit‘s marketplace decline about 40 per cent and sales are not bringing in 
enough revenue to support overhead. 
 August: U.S. Home Construction Index is down over 40 per cent as of 
mid-August 2006 compared to a year earlier. 
 August 26: Defaults on subprime mortgages start to occur much earlier in 
the mortgage process. Investors and analysts believe this trend could be 
the result of lax underwriting quality or a sign of a weakening mortgage 
credit market. 
 September 7: Nouriel Roubini warns the International Monetary Fund 
about a coming US housing bust, mortgage-backed securities failures, 
bank failures, and a recession. His work was based partly on his study of 
recent economic crises in Russia (1998), Argentina (2000), Mexico (1994), 
and Asia (1997). 
 Fall 2006: J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon directs the firm to reduce its 
exposure to subprime mortgages. 
 December 2006: Goldman-Sachs claims after the fact that it began 
reducing its exposure to subprime mortgages at this point. It also begins 
increasing its short positions. Others claim these risk decisions were made 
in the spring and summer 2007. 
 Lenders make U.S. $640 billion in subprime loans, 20 per cent of all 
mortgage lending was subprime. 
2007: 
Home sales continue to fall. The plunge in existing-home sales is the steepest 
since 1989. In Q1/2007, S&P/Case-Shiller house price index records first 
year-over-year decline in nationwide house prices since 1991. The subprime 
mortgage industry collapses, and a surge of foreclosure activity (twice as bad 
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as 2006) and rising interest rates threaten to depress prices further as 
problems in the subprime markets spread to the near-prime and prime 
mortgage markets. 
 January 3: Ownit Mortgage Solutions Inc. files for Chapter11. Records 
show that Ownit Mortgage Solutions owed Merrill Lynch around U.S. $93 
million at the time of filing. 
 February 5: Mortgage Lenders Network USA Inc., the country‘s 15th 
largest subprime lender with U.S. $3.3 billion in loans funded in third 
quarter 2006, files for Chapter 11. 
 February 7: HSBC, a large London based bank, issues a warning that an 
earlier statement about its Mortgage Services operations will be much 
worse than current market estimates. 
 February 10: The Group of Seven Finance Ministers meet in Essen, 
Germany to discuss worldwide financial problems. One of the main 
concerns is the lack of regulation of hedge funds. Germany says this could 
be a source of systematic risk for the financial system where the US 
believed market discipline is the best way to address the issue. 
 February-March: Subprime industry collapse; several subprime lenders 
declaring bankruptcy, announcing significant losses, or putting them up for 
sale. These include Accredited Home Lenders Holding, New Century 
Financial, DR Horton and Countrywide Financial. 
 March: The value of USA subprime mortgage was estimated at U.S. $1.3 
trillion as of March 2007. 
 March 6: In a speech before the Independent Community Bankers of 
America‘s Annual Convention and Techworld, Honolulu, Hawaii, Ben 
Bernanke, quoting Alan Greenspan, warns that the Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were a 
source of ―systemic risk‖ and suggest legislation to head off a possible 
crisis. 
 April 3: New Century Financial, largest U.S. subprime lender, files for 
chapter 11 bankruptcy, cuts 54 per cent of its workforce or 3,200 jobs. 
 April 12: SouthStar Funding LLC files for chapter 7. 
 April 24: U.S. total house sales reduce 8.4 per cent in March. 
 June 7: Bear Stearns & Co informs investors in two of its funds, the 
High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund and the 
High-Grade Structured Credit Fund that it was halting redemptions 
because of liquidity problems.9  
29 
 
 June 20: Merrill Lynch seized U.S. $800 million in assets from Bear 
Stearns hedge funds that were involved in securities backed by subprime 
loans. 
 June 25: FDIC Chair Shelia Bair cautioned against the more flexible risk 
management standards of the Basel II international accord and lowering 
bank capital requirements generally: "There are strong reasons for 
believing that banks left to their own devices would maintain less capital -- 
not more -- than would be prudent. The fact is, banks do benefit from 
implicit and explicit government safety nets...In short, regulators can't leave 
capital decisions totally to the banks." 
 June 27: SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox, testifies to Congress that the 
SEC has opened 12 enforcement investigations into collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO) practices. This was in response to questions from 
Congress about the transparency of CDOs. 
 July 6: UBS fires CEO and the heir apparent for chairman of the board, 
Peter Wuffi. 
 July 9: Credit Suisse releases a report that shows CDO losses could total 
up to U.S. $52 billion. 
 July 10: The Federal Reserve reports that consumer credit debt rose at an 
annual rate of 6.4 per cent, the biggest jump in six months. This was close 
to double what analysts were expecting. 
 July 17: In a letter sent to investors, two Bear Stearns hedge funds 
specializing in subprime debt announce that each fund has lost at least 90 
per cent of its value. Bear Stearns declined to provide more liquidity 
following the U.S. $3.2 billion given as a bailout in June 2007 to cover 
margin calls. The total of investor contributions to the funds was around 
U.S. $1.6 billion. AAA tranches of subprime debt were the only rating 
investing in by the funds. 
 July 19: Dow Jones industrial Average closes above 14,000 for the first 
time in its history. 
 July 24: Countrywide Financial announces that second quarter profits were 
down 33 per cent. 
 August: worldwide "credit crunch" as subprime mortgage backed 
securities are discovered in portfolios of banks and hedge funds around the 
world, from BNP Paribas to Bank of China. Many lenders stop offering 
home equity loans and "stated income" loans.10 Federal Reserve injects 
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about U.S. $100 billion into the money supply for banks to borrow at a low 
rate. 
 August 3: A German government-led bailout of IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank results in state-owned Kfw assuming up to €1 billion in 
expected possible losses. Kfw and other banks agreed to guarantee a 
liquidity line of up to €8.1 billion to cover the loss in value of the bank‘s 
subprime US investments. 
 August 6: American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation (AHMI) files 
chapter11 bankruptcy. The company expects to see up to a U.S. $60 
million loss for the first quarter 2007. 
 August 7: Numerous quantitative long/short equity hedge funds suddenly 
begin experiencing unprecedented losses as a result of what is believed to 
be liquidations by some managers‘ eager to access cash during the 
liquidity crisis. It highlights one of the first examples of the contagion effect 
of the subprime crisis spilling over into a radically different business area. 
 August 9: French investment bank BNP Paribas suspends three 
investment funds that invested in subprime mortgage debt, due to a 
"complete evaporation of liquidity" in the market. The bank's 
announcement is the first of many credit-loss and write-down 
announcements by banks, mortgage lenders and other institutional 
investors, as subprime assets went bad, due to defaults by subprime 
mortgage payers. This announcement compels the intervention of the 
European Central Bank, pumping 95 billion Euros into the European 
banking market. 
 August 10: Central banks coordinate efforts to increase liquidity for first 
time since the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The 
United States Federal Reserve (Fed) injects a combined 43 billion USD, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) 156 billion euros (214.6 billion USD), 
and the Bank of Japan 1 trillion Yen (8.4 billion USD). Smaller amounts 
come from the central banks of Australia, and Canada. 
 August 14: Sentinel Management Group suspends redemptions for 
investors and sells off U.S. $312 million worth of assets; three days later 
Sentinel files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. US and European stock 
indices continue to fall. 
 August 15: The stock of Countrywide Financial, which is the largest 
mortgage lender in the United States, falls around 13 per cent on the New 
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York Stock Exchange after Countrywide says foreclosures and mortgage 
delinquencies have risen to their highest levels since early 2002. 
 August 16: Countrywide Financial Corporation, the biggest U.S. mortgage 
lender, narrowly avoids bankruptcy by taking out an emergency loan of U.S. 
$11.5 billion from a group of banks. Fitch drops Countrywide to BBB+ and 
Moody‘s drops to Baa3. 
 August 17: The Federal Reserve cuts the discount rate by half a percent to 
5.75 per cent from 6.25 per cent while leaving the federal funds rate 
unchanged in an attempt to stabilize financial markets. 
 August 26: Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), the German public 
sector bank, agrees to buy Sachsen Landesbank for €250 million. Sachsen 
LB is the second German bank that needed to be bailed out. 
 August 28: The National Association of Realtors (NAR) reports that the 
supply of unsold homes in the US was at its highest in sixteen years in July. 
 August 31: President Bush announces a limited bailout of U.S. 
homeowners unable to pay the rising costs of their debts. Ameriquest, once 
the largest subprime lender in the U.S., goes out of business. 
 September 1-3: Fed Economic Symposium in Jackson Hole, WY 
addressed the housing recession that jeopardizes U.S. growth. Several 
critics argue that the Fed should use regulation and interest rates to 
prevent asset-price bubbles, blamed former Fed-chairman Alan 
Greenspan's low interest rate policies for stoking the U.S. housing boom 
and subsequent bust, and Yale University economist Robert Shiller warned 
of possible home price declines of fifty percent. 
 September 4: The Libor rate rises to its highest level since December 
1998, at 6.7975 per cent, above the Bank of England's 5.75 per cent base 
rate. 
 September 6: The Federal Reserve adds U.S. $31.25 billion in temporary 
reserves (loans) to the US money markets which has to be repaid in two 
weeks. 
 September 7: US Labor Department announces that non-farm payrolls fell 
by 4,000 in August 2007, the first month of negative job growth since 
August 2003, due in large part to problems in the housing and credit 
markets. 
 September 14: The Bank of England extends emergency funding to 
Northern Rock, a large British mortgage lender. The move came after 
investors withdrew support of Northern Rock amid worries that the 
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institution could face short term difficulties in raising the needed capital in 
the wholesale market.  
 September 17: Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan said ―we had a 
bubble in housing‖ and warns of ―large double digit declines‖ in home 
values ―larger than most people expect.‖ 
 September 18: The Fed lowers interest rates by half a point (0.5 per cent) 
in an attempt to limit damage to the economy from the housing and credit 
crises. 
 September 26: The Bank of England announces an auction of £10 billion 
of emergency three-month funds at 6.75 per cent and agrees to accept 
mortgages from banks as collateral. This was an attempt to provide the 
much needed liquidity to the banking system in England but they received 
no bids. 
 September 30: Affected by the spiraling mortgage and credit crises, 
Internet banking pioneer NetBank goes bankrupt, and the Swiss bank UBS 
announces that it lost U.S. $690 million in the third quarter. After the 
announcement, the chief executive of its investment banking division, Huw 
Jenkins was replaced. 
 October 3: Morgan Stanley cuts 600 jobs. This amounted to 1 per cent of 
its workforce. 
 October 5: Merrill Lynch announces a U.S. $5.5 billion loss as a 
consequence of the subprime crisis, which is revised to U.S. $8.4 billion on 
October 24, a sum that credit rating firm Standard & Poor‘s called 
―startling‖. 
 October 11: There are currently U.S. $350 billion in the adjustable-rate 
mortgages (ARMs) in the US marketplace. Record levels of foreclosures 
are expected to worsen as the ARMs reset to higher interest rates. 
RealtyTrac, which keeps housing data, releases a report that says 
foreclosures in the US housing market have doubled in September 
compared to the same time last year. The number of foreclosures is 
actually down 8 per cent from August. 
 October 16: Citigroup‘s profits drop 57 per cent from the same quarter last 
year. Write downs linked to subprime mortgages, which totaled over U.S. 
$3 billion, are blamed for the drop. 
 October 15-17: A consortium of U.S. banks backed by the U.S. 
government announces a "super fund" of U.S. $100 billion to purchase 
mortgage-backed securities whose mark-to-market value plummeted in the 
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subprime collapse. Both Fed chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury 
Secretary Hank Paulson express alarm about the dangers posed by the 
bursting housing bubble; Paulson says "the housing decline is still 
unfolding and I view it as the most significant risk to our economy. … The 
longer housing prices remain stagnant or fall, the greater the penalty to our 
future economic growth." 
 October 17: Morgan Stanley cuts another 300 bankers11 in its credit 
trading, structured products, and leveraged lending areas. This resulted 
from a worldwide freeze in activities in the global credit markets. 
 October 25: Merrill Lynch announces a U.S. $2.24 billion loss in the third 
quarter. This was mainly from the U.S. $7.9 billion in write downs on CDOs 
and subprime mortgages. 
 October 26: Countrywide Financial reports first loss in 25 years, third 
quarter loss of U.S. $1.2 billion on about U.S. $1 billion in write downs. 
 October 31: Merrill Lynch (ML) CEO, Stan O‘Neal, resigns after an 
announcement that ML would write down around U.S. $7.9 billion debt 
caused by their exposure to the subprime mortgage market. O‘Neal is 
offered U.S. $160 million payout from ML to leave. 
 October 31: Federal Reserve lowers the federal funds rate by 25 basis 
points to 4.5 per cent. 
 November 1: Federal Reserve injects U.S. $41 billion into the money 
supply for banks to borrow at a low rate. The largest single expansion by 
the Fed since U.S. $50.35 billion on September 19, 2001. 
 November 5: Citigroup CEO, Chuck Prince, resigns after an 
announcement that Citigroup may have to write down up to U.S. $11 billion 
in bad debt from losses in the subprime mortgage crisis. 
 November 13: Bank of America says it will have to write off U.S. $3 billion 
of bad debt. The bank also said it will spend U.S. $600 million supporting 
some of its funds because of possible liquidity problems. 
 November 15: Barclays confirms a U.S. $1.6 billion write down in the 
month of October on their subprime holdings. The bank also released that 
more than £5 billion in exposure to subprime loan packages could lead to 
more write downs in the future. 
 November 15: Financial Accounting Standards Board "Fair Value 
Measurements" standards upgrade the quality of financial reporting 
through greater transparency. However, this "mark-to-market" accounting 
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may exaggerate the loss in value of an asset, as shown on balance sheets, 
and trigger a cascade of unnecessary financial losses. 
 November 21: Freddie Mac announces a U.S. $2 billion loss in mortgage 
defaults and credit losses. Shares in Freddie Mac dropped 28.7 per cent 
and Fannie Mae dropped 24.8 per cent upon the announcement.  
 November 23: Two French banks pledge U.S. $1.5 billion to bailout French 
bond insurer CIFG.  
 November 27: Citigroup raises U.S. $7.5 billion from Abu Dhabi 
government. Freddie Mac announces a U.S. $6 billion share issue to cover 
more losses from mortgages. Kfw, a German state-owned bank, doubled 
its balance sheet risk provisions from their bailout of IKB to €4.8 billion in 
expected losses. 
 November 29: The Nationwide building society announces that UK 
housing prices fell by 0.8 per cent in November, the largest drop in 12 
years. The Bank of England releases data that mortgage approvals fell to 
their lowest level since 2005 in October. This data is starting to reveal the 
slowdown in the UK housing market. 
 December 6: President Bush announces a plan to voluntarily and 
temporarily freeze the mortgages of a limited number of mortgage debtors 
holding adjustable rate mortgages (ARM). He also asked Members of 
Congress to: 1. Pass legislation to modernize the FHA. 2. Temporarily 
reform the tax code to help homeowners refinance during this time of 
housing market stress. 3. Pass funding to support mortgage counseling. 4. 
Pass legislation to reform Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) like 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. 
 December 10: UBS announces U.S. $10 billion more in write downs 
associated with their subprime holdings. 
 December 12: The Fed created a Term Auction Facility (TAF) designed to 
allow banks to get Fed funds by pledging all sorts of collateral. The TAF is 
open to all depository institutions judged to be in sound financial condition. 
TAF is designed to provide more liquidity to the ailing credit markets. The 
Federal Open Market Committee also approved swap agreements 
(reciprocal currency arrangements) which will provide U.S. $20 billion to 
the European Central Bank and U.S. $4 billion to the Swiss National Bank. 
These swap lines were approved for up to six months. The coordinated 
effort by the world‘s central banks to inject liquidity into the financial system 
was agreed upon at the G-20 meeting, a meeting of the world‘s twenty 
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largest economies, last month in Cape Town. The outlines of the responses 
were derived at the G-20 meeting and the central banks had stayed in 
close contact with each other and were pushed into action as the markets 
deteriorated last week. 
 December 18: The European Central Bank allocates U.S. $502 billion to 
banks at a below market interest rate to ease the credit crisis. The aim is to 
inject liquidity in the market and cut the cost of lending between commercial 
and retail banks. The ECB was one of five central banks to inject liquidity 
into the market. 
 December 19: Morgan Stanley announces U.S. $9.4 billion in write downs 
from subprime losses. To cover the write downs, Morgan Stanley received 
a capital injection from a Chinese sovereign wealth fund of U.S. $5 billion. 
2008: 
Starting in late 2007, and throughout 2008, the ‗monoline‘ municipal bond 
insurance companies, such as AMBAC, MBIA, and ACA, have their credit 
ratings downgraded by the credit rating agencies because they had also gotten 
‗insurance‘ policies (via credit default swaps) on mortgage-based CDOs. Since 
the entire ‗municipal bond insurance‘ business model depends on the insurer 
having a very high credit rating, these companies begin to collapse, and the 
value of many of the bonds they insured also falls. 
 January 2-21: January 2008 stock market downturn. 
 January 9: The Global Economic Prospects study released by the World 
Bank predicts the worldwide economy will grow at 3.3 per cent (in dollar 
terms) in 2008. The bank estimates that the US will grow at 2.2 per cent 
and emerging markets‘ strong growth will help dampen the downturn 
effects of the credit crisis on the worldwide economy. 
 January 21: Global stock markets in London and Europe suffer the biggest 
one day loss since September 11, 2001. The FTSE 100 index falls 5.5 per 
cent wiping out £76 billion in market value as investors sell off equity for the 
safety of government bonds.  
 January 22: A new panic in the global credit market leads the Fed to cut 
interest rates by 75 basis points. This is the largest cut in over two 
decades. 
 January 24: The National Association of Realtors (NAR) announces that 
2007 had the largest drop in existing home sales in 25 years, and "the first 
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price decline in many, many years and possibly going back to the Great 
Depression."  
 January 24: Bush and Congress agree on a U.S. $150 billion economic 
stimulus plan to save the US economy from slipping into a recession. The 
package included sending tax refund checks from U.S. $300 to U.S. $1,200 
to over 117 million American families. Also included was a lifting of the 
mortgage purchase limit of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from $417,000 to 
$625,000.12 
 February 13: Data from the Financial Services Agency (FSA), the 
Japanese financial watchdog, shows that losses from the Japanese 
exposure to the subprime crisis reached U.S. $5.6 billion in 2007. Of the 
U.S. $5.6 billion in write downs, more than half came from the last three 
months of 2007. 
 February 17: Britain announces the nationalization of Northern Rock. 
Northern Rock owed the Bank of England £25 billion in loans after a run on 
the bank last September. 
 February 28: AIG announces a U.S. $5.2 billion loss for the fourth quarter 
of 2007, the second consecutive quarter of losses. 
 March 3: UK‘s largest bank, HSBC, reports a U.S. $17.2 billion loss on 
write downs of its US mortgage portfolio. 
 March 5: France‘s largest retail bank, Credit Agricole, announces a €857 
million loss after write downs of €3.3 billion on its exposure to the credit 
crisis. 
 March 6: A £1 billion hedge fund controlled by Peloton Partners collapses. 
The ABS Master Fund returned an 87 per cent growth rate last year but 
was unable to meet interest payments on loans taken out as a result of the 
credit crunch. 
 March 10: Dow Jones Industrial Average at the lowest level since October 
2006, falling more than 20 per cent from its peak just five months prior. 
 March 16: Bear Stearns is acquired for U.S. $2 a share by JPMorgan 
Chase in a fire sale avoiding bankruptcy. The deal is backed by the Federal 
Reserve, providing up to U.S. $30B to cover possible Bear Stearn losses. 
 April 7: Chief executive of KfW, Ingrid Matthaus-Maier, resigns because of 
health reasons. KfW bailed out troubled German bank IKB in August 2007 
and the original bailout of €1 billion had turned into €7.2 billion as new 
losses from IKB‘s exposure to the US subprime market were realized. 
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 April 8: The International Monetary Fund releases its Global Stability 
Report. The new estimate on credit crunch losses is projected upwards to 
U.S. $945 billion. 
 April 9: Washington Mutual, the largest savings and loans bank in the US, 
announces it will raise U.S. $7 billion from outside investors to cover losses 
arising from its subprime mortgage. 
 April 14: Wachovia announces plans to raise U.S. $7 billion in capital after 
reporting a first quarter loss of U.S. $393 million. 
 May 6: UBS AG Swiss bank announces plans to cut 5500 jobs by the 
middle of 2009. 
 May 13: The Financial Times releases a write downs table showing the 
worldwide bank write off totaling almost U.S. $450 billion since January 
2007. 
 May 21: A Financial Times investigation uncovered that Moody‘s awarded 
an incorrect AAA rating to billions of dollars of complex debt products. 
 June 5: NY Attorney General, Andrew Cuomo announces rating agency 
reform agreements with S&P, Moody‘s, and Fitch. 
 June 16: The SEC announces plans to overhaul the credit rating agency 
regulation to increase competition and remove the conflict of interests 
between the agencies and the investment banks. 
 June 19: Former Bear Stearns hedge fund managers were arrested, 
bringing about the first criminal charges in the credit crisis. The charges 
included securities fraud and insider trading. 
 July 1: The Treasury in England announces new legislation covering 
financial stability, failing banks, and depositor protection in an attempt to 
avoid another Northern Rock situation. The new guarantee scheme raises 
the deposits covered from £35,000 to £50,000. 
 July 11: Indymac Bank, a subsidiary of Independent National Mortgage 
Corporation (Indymac), is placed into the receivership of the FDIC by the 
Office of Thrift Supervision. It was the fourth-largest bank failure in United 
States history, and the second-largest failure of a regulated thrift. Before its 
failure, IndyMac Bank was the largest savings and loan association in the 
Los Angeles area and the seventh-largest mortgage originator in the United 
States. 
 July 14: The rescue plan to save Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae proposed 
by Henry Paulson. The government said that it will approach Congress for 
the authority to give unlimited funds to make sure that Fannie Mae and 
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Freddie Mac do not fail. The Federal Reserve announced it will provide 
Freddie and Fannie emergency funds on the same terms as banks should 
it become necessary. 
 July 16: One of Spain‘s largest property companies, Martinsa-Fadesa, files 
for bankrupty. 
 July 17: Major banks and financial institutions had borrowed and invested 
heavily in mortgage backed securities and reported losses of approximately 
U.S. $435 billion as of 17 July 2008. 
 July 29: U.S. home prices drop 15.8 per cent in May according to Standard 
& Poor‘s index reports. This is the steepest one month drop since the index 
was started eight years ago — eclipsing the 15.3 per cent drop in April. 
 July 30: President Bush signs into law the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, which authorizes the Federal Housing 
Administration13 to guarantee up to U.S. $300 billion in new 30-year fixed 
rate mortgages for subprime borrowers if lenders write-down principal loan 
balances to 90 per cent of current appraisal value. 
 July 31: Deutsche Bank reveals more write downs bringing the total so far 
to U.S. $7.8 billion for this year. Nationwide Building Society in the U.K. 
releases data showing a drop in monthly housing prices of 8.1 per cent 
compared to July of last year. 
 August 7: U.K. housing prices fell 11 per cent from January to July 2008. 
 August 11: A Moody‘s report shows that U.K. subprime defaults jump. This 
report shows that the default rate on U.K. subprime mortgages increased 
from 7.3 per cent in the second quarter of 2007 to 10 per cent in the second 
quarter of 2008. 
 August 13: U.K. inflation rate exceeds the bank interest rate for the first 
time in twenty-seven years. 
 September 7: Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which at 
that point owned or guaranteed about half of the U.S.'s $12 trillion 
mortgage market, effectively nationalizing them. This causes panic 
because almost every home mortgage lender and Wall Street bank relied 
on them to facilitate the mortgage market and investors worldwide owned 
U.S. $5.2 trillion of debt securities backed by them. 
 September 14: Merrill Lynch is sold to Bank of America amidst fears of a 
liquidity crisis and Lehman Brothers collapse. 
 September 15: Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protection. 
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 September 16: Moody's and Standard and Poor's downgrade ratings on 
AIG's credit on concerns over continuing losses to mortgage-backed 
securities, sending the company into fears of insolvency. In addition, the 
Reserve Primary Fund "breaks the buck" leading to a run on the money 
market funds.14 Over U.S. $140 billion is withdrawn vs. U.S. $7 billion the 
week prior. This leads to problems for the commercial paper market, a key 
source of funding for corporations, which suddenly could not get funds or 
had to pay much higher interest rates.15 
 September 17: The U.S. Federal Reserve lends $85 billion to American 
International Group (AIG) to avoid bankruptcy.  
 September 18: Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke meet with key legislators to propose a $700 billion emergency 
bailout through the purchase of toxic assets. Bernanke tells them: "If we 
don't do this, we may not have an economy on Monday." Central banks 
from around the world announce U.S. $180 billion emergency injection to 
provide liquidity and halt the escalating crisis. This was in response to the 
lack of lending between banks that had occurred in the U.S. and U.K. 
following the AIG bailout. 
 September 19: The Russian stock market gains 30 per cent after having 
trading suspended for two days. This was in response to a government 
pledge of more than U.S. $100 billion in liquidity to help the credit squeeze. 
The US Treasury announces it will insure money market funds in an 
attempt to prevent a run on the funds. U.S. President, George W. Bush, 
approved use of up to U.S. $50 billion from the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund to insure the holdings of any publicly offered money market mutual 
fund. Henry Paulson urges Congress to pass legislation that will allow the 
government to buy toxic mortgage securities from the banks. The proposal 
will give the Treasury authority to purchase up to U.S. $700 billion of the 
troubled assets by issuing Treasury securities. The chairman of the 
Treasury, Mr. Paulson, will have the discretion to determine the timing and 
scale of the purchases. 
 September 21: The Russian finance ministry announces it will provide U.S. 
$24.21 billion in additional funds to the banking system in the form of 
three-month bonds. 
 September 22: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are approved by the 
Federal Reserve to become bank holding companies which subjects them 
to regulation by the Fed. 
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 September 24: Goldman Sachs announces it will receive a U.S. $5 billion 
capital infusion from Warren Buffett‘s company Berkshire Hathaway. 
 September 25: Washington Mutual is seized by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and its banking assets are sold to JP Morgan 
Chase for U.S. $1.9 billion. This is the biggest bank failure in U.S. history. 
The U.K. government nationalizes Bradford & Bingley (B&B) after retail 
savers withdraw tens of millions of pounds in recent days. 
 September 29: The U.S. House of Representatives votes against the U.S. 
$700 billion bailout bill proposed by the Treasury. Citigroup agrees to buy 
the banking operations of Wachovia, the sixth largest lender in the U.S. for 
U.S. $2.2 billion. The European Central Bank along with the governments 
of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg agree to nationalize Fortis, 
the European banking and insurance giant. One of Germany‘s biggest 
lenders, Hypo Real Estate (HRE), had to be rescued by the German 
government and other banks after a €50 billion liquidity crisis. The 
government of Iceland takes control of Glitnir, the country‘s third largest 
bank. Mitsubishi UFJ invests U.S. $9 billion in Morgan Stanley in exchange 
for a 21 per cent share of the company. 
 September 30: Dexia, a Franco-Belgian bank specializing in local authority 
finance, gets a €6.4 billion capital injection from various European 
governments. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issues a clarification on 
fair value accounting. US Treasury changes tax law to allow a bank 
acquiring another to write off all of the acquired bank‘s losses for tax 
purposes. 
 October 1: The U.S. Senate passes HR1424, their version of the U.S. 
$700 billion bailout bill.16 The financial crisis spreads to Europe. 
 October 3: President George W. Bush signs the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act, creating a U.S. $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief 
Program to purchase failing bank assets. It contains also easing of the 
accounting rules that forced companies to collapse because of the 
existence of toxic mortgage-related investments. Also key to winning 
GOP17 support was a decision by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to ease mark-to-market accounting rules that require financial 
institutions to show the deflated value of assets on their balance sheets. 
 October 3: Using tax law change made September 30, Wells makes a 
higher offer for Wachovia, scooping it from Citigroup. 
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 October 6-10: Worst week for the stock market in 75 years. The Dow 
Jones loses 22.1 per cent, its worst week on record, down 40.3 per cent 
since reaching a record high of 14,164.53 October 9, 2007. The Standard & 
Poor‘s 500 index loses 18.2 per cent, its worst week since 1933, down 42.5 
per cent in since its own high October 9, 2007. 
 October 6: Fed announces that it will provide U.S. $900 billion in 
short-term cash loans to banks. 
 October 7: Fed makes emergency move to lend around U.S. $1.3 trillion 
directly to companies outside the financial sector. 
 October 7: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relaxes rules on US 
corporations repatriating money held oversees in an attempt to inject 
liquidity into the US financial market. The new ruling allows the companies 
to receive loans from their foreign subsidiaries for longer periods and more 
times a year without triggering the 35 per cent corporate income tax. 
 October 8: Central banks in U.S.A. (Fed), England, China, Canada, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the European Central Bank cut rates in a 
coordinated effort to aid world economy. 
Fed also reduces its emergency lending rate to banks by half a percentage 
point, to 1.75 per cent. 
White House considers taking ownership stakes in private banks as a part 
of the bailout bill. Warren Buffett and George Soros criticized the original 
approach of the bailout bill. 
The UK government launches a £400 billion rescue plan to help restore 
confidence in the financial markets.  
 October 11: The Dow Jones Industrial Average caps its worst week ever 
with its highest volatility day ever recorded in its 112 year history. Over the 
last eight trading days, the DJIA has dropped 22 per cent amid worries of 
worsening credit crisis and global recession. Paper losses now on U.S. 
stocks now total U.S. $8.4 trillion from the market highs last year. 
The G7, a group of central bankers and finance ministers from the Group of 
Seven leading economies, meet in Washington and agree to urgent and 
exceptional coordinated action to prevent the credit crisis from throwing the 
world into depression. The G7 did not agree on the concrete plan that was 
hoped for. 
 October 13: European Union leaders meet in Paris to coordinate efforts to 
combat Europe‘s credit crisis. French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, pledges 
€360 billion in liquidity to French banks. The U.K. government starts the 
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nationalization process by injecting £37 billion in the nation‘s three largest 
banks. The U.K. government will end up owning a majority share in the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and over a 40 per cent share in Lloydes and 
HBOS. 
 October 14: The U.S. taps into the U.S. $700 billion available from the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and announces the injection of U.S. 
$250 billion of public money into the U.S. banking system. The form of the 
rescue will include the U.S. government taking an equity position in banks 
that choose to participate in the program in exchange for certain restrictions 
such as executive compensation. Nine banks agreed to participate in the 
program and will receive half of the total funds: 1) Bank of America, 2) 
JPMorgan Chase, 3) Wells Fargo, 4) Citigroup, 5) Merrill Lynch, 6) 
Goldman Sachs, 7) Morgan Stanley, 8) Bank of New York Mellon and 9) 
State Street. Other US financial institutions eligible for the plan have until 
November 14 to agree to the terms. 
 October 15: Greece announces a €28 billion package to support the 
banking sector and sustain economic growth. 
 October 17: The European Union 27 leaders sign off on a joint U.S. $2.7 
trillion bank bailout plan after a 2-day summit in Brussels. 
 October 19: The South Korean government announces a U.S. $130 billion 
rescue package for its banks and companies to help withstand the credit 
crisisl. 
The Dutch government injects €10 billion into banking and insurance group 
ING. 
 October 20: Pakistan discusses a U.S. $10-15 billion international support 
package with the International Monetary Fund. Iceland seeks U.S. $6 
billion rescue package from the International Monetary Fund to help 
stabilize its economy. Sweden announces a U.S. $205 billion program to 
stabilize its financial system and boost liquidity. 
 October 21: The US Federal Reserve announces that it will spend U.S. 
$540 billion to purchase short-term debt from money market mutual funds. 
The large amount of redemption requests during the credit crisis have 
caused the money market funds to scale back lending to banks contributing 
to the credit freeze on interbank lending markets. This government is 
hoping the injection will help unfreeze the credit markets making it easier 
for businesses and banks to obtain loans. The structure of the plan involves 
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the Fed setting up four special purpose vehicles that will purchase the 
assets.18 
 November 4: Brazil‘s second largest non-state bank. Itau Holding 
Financeira SA, will purchase its smaller rival, Unibanco, creating Latin 
America‘s largest bank. 
 November 5: Barack Obama wins the US presidential election. 
 November 12: Treasury Secretary Paulson abandons plan to buy toxic 
assets under the U.S. $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
Mr. Paulson said the remaining U.S. $410 billion in the fund would be better 
spent on recapitalizing financial companies. 
 November 15: The group of 20 of the world‘s largest economies meets in 
Washington DC and releases a statement of the meeting. Although no 
detailed plans were agreed upon, the meeting focused on implementing 
policies consistent with five principles: strengthening transparency and 
accountability, improving regulation, promoting market integrity, reinforcing 
cooperation and reforming international institutions. 
 November 17: The Treasury gives out U.S. $33.6 billion to 21 banks in the 
second round of disbursements from the U.S. $700 billion bailout fund. This 
payout brings the total to U.S. $158.56 billion so far. 
 November 24: The U.S. government agrees to rescue Citigroup after an 
attack by investors causes the stock price to plummet 60 per cent over the 
last week under a detailed plan that including injecting another U.S. $20 
billion of capital into Citigroup bringing the total infusion to U.S. $45 billion. 
 November 25: The U.S. Federal Reserve pledges U.S. $800 billion more 
to help revive the financial system. U.S. $600 billion will be used to buy 
mortgage bonds issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
the Federal Home Loan Banks. 
 November 28: The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the global 
organization behind the Basel Accord, issues a consultative paper 
providing supervisory guidance on the valuation of assets. The paper 
provides ten principles that should be used by banks to value assets at fair 
market value. 
 December 11: The Bank of Korea cuts interest rates to 3 per cent, more 
than twice the expected reduction. Korea may be hurt significantly by the 
global financial crisis because of its high levels of foreign debt. 
 December 17: In a surprise move, the Federal Reserve Lowers interest 
rates to a range of 0-0.25. 
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 December 18: Norges Bank cuts Norway‘s interest rate to 3 per cent. 
 December 19: The Bank of Japan cuts Japan‘s interest rate to 0.1 per 
cent. 
 December 22: China cuts interest rates to 5.31 per cent, the fifth cut in the 
last three months. The People‘s Bank of China also reduced the capital 
reserve requirement by 50 basis points in an effort to restore China‘s high 
growth rate. 
2009: 
 January 8: The Bank of England cuts interest rates to 1.5 per cent to help 
ease the flow of credit to companies. This brings the UK interest rate to a 
315-year low. 
 January 10: Unemployment is the United States jumps to 7.2 per cent, its 
highest in 16 years. Unemployment was at 4.4 per cent before the credit 
crisis hit. 
 January 14: Standard & Poor‘s (S&P) cuts Greece‘s credit rating on debt. 
S&P cited the worsening of Greece‘s large public debt as the reason for the 
downgrade. Greece is the first major western European country to have its 
debt downgraded, but Portugal, Spain, and Ireland are being closely 
watched by the credit rating agencies. 
 January 23: Reports show the global credit crisis contagion continues to 
deepen in Asia. China announces the slowest growth in seven years, the 
Bank of Japan reduced economic forecasts for the next two years, and 
South Korea reports the first decline in quarterly economic growth since the 
Asian financial crisis. 
 February 7: Job losses in the United States reach 3.5 million in the last 12 
months, including 500,000 in January. The jobs lost in January represent 
the highest losses in the US since 1974. The unemployment rate has risen 
to 7.6 per cent, almost double the 4.4 per cent before the credit crisis. 
 February 17: US President Barack Obama signs a U.S. $787 billion 
economic stimulus package into law. The stimulus is designed to jump start 
the economy and create more jobs by through government spending and 
tax cuts. 
 February 18: A study by the Boston Consulting Group shows that the 
global financial crisis has depleted the market value of the world‘s banks by 
U.S. $5.5 trillion. This amount is equivalent to 10 per cent of the world‘s 
gross domestic product. 
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 February 25: The US Treasury announces details of the Capital 
Assistance Program (CAP). The CAP plan includes running stress tests on 
banks to determine if the banks will require additional capital. 
 February 26: The UK government announces a plan to insure U.S. $712 
billion in toxic assets. 
 February 27: The US Treasury announces it will take a 36 per cent stake 
in Citigroup. The UK government releases plans to inject £25.5 billion (U.S. 
$36.5 billion) into the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). 
U.S. President Barack Obama releases a 10-year budget outline for the US 
economy. The budget allows for U.S. $750 billion of new capital for 
financial stabilization efforts. The budget shows the US deficit quadrupling 
in 2009 to U.S. $1,750 billion. 
 March 9: A study by the Asian Development Bank (ADP) shows that the 
value of global financial assets tumbled U.S. $50 trillion in 2008. The losses 
in Asia alone totaled U.S. $9.6 trillion, the highest of any emerging 
economy. 
 March 12: The African Development Bank (AfDB) sets up a U.S. $1.5 
billion emergency bailout fund to help alleviate the impact of the global 
financial crisis in Africa. 
 March 13: G20 finance ministers meet in southern England to discuss 
strategies to fix the global economy. China promised to support the global 
economy with its available stimulus tools if necessary. 
 March 17: In February, credit card defaults in the U.S. rise to the highest 
level in the last 20 years. Two of the largest issuers, Citigroup and 
American Express, reported default rates of around 9 per cent. 
 March 23: The U.S. Treasury announces details of the Public-Private 
Investment Program. The program includes using U.S. $75 to U.S. $100 
billion from the Troubled Asset Relief Program combined with private 
capital to generate U.S. $500 billion to buy toxic assets from troubled 
banks. 
 March 30: The Bank of Spain rescues the first Spanish financial institution 
since the financial crisis began. The government will provide U.S. $11.9 
billion in liquidity to Caja Castilla La Mancha (CCM) and replace its 
directors with central bank nominees. 
 April 2: G20 leaders meet in London to combat the global financial crisis. 
 June 18: President Obama reveals a dramatic overhaul of way the U.S. 
government oversees financial markets. 
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 June 20: The European Union approves a plan to create a European 
Systemic Risk Council for financial regulation. 
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Footnotes 
1. On September 7, 2008, the director of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), James B. Lockhart III, announced his decision to place 
two Government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, into conservatorship run by the FHFA. It was one financial event 
among many in the ongoing subprime mortgage crisis. 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), commonly known as 
Fannie Mae, was founded in 1938 during the Great Depression as part of 
the New Deal. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), 
known as Freddie Mac was created in 1970. Both of them were created to 
expand the secondary market for mortgages in the U.S. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac buy mortgages on the secondary market, pool them, and sell 
them as a mortgage backed security to investors on the open market. This 
secondary mortgage market increases the supply of money available for 
mortgage lending and allows lenders to reinvest their assets into more 
lending for new home purchases. 
2. Greece‘s credit rating was cut three levels from B to CCC by Standard & 
Poor‘s, which branded the nation with the world‘s lowest debt grade and 
said a restructuring looks ―increasingly likely.‖ S&P said: ―Risks for the 
implementation of Greece‘s E.U./IMF borrowing program are rising, given 
Greece‘s increased financing needs and ongoing internal political 
disagreements surrounding the policy conditions required.‖ 
3. On September 15, 2008. Ten of the world‘s largest banks agree to pool U.S. 
$70 billion in a liquidity fund to mitigate the expected failure of Lehman 
Brothers. The ten banks involved are Banks of America, Barclays, 
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan 
Chase, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and UBS. Each of the banks will be 
able to borrow up to one third of the fund by pledging a wide range of 
collateral that is not accepted for Fed loans. The Fed also relaxed 
regulations and said it would allow a broader range of collateral for Fed 
loans and it will also suspend the rule that prohibits deposit-taking banks 
from using deposits to help finance their investment banking subsidiaries 
until January 30, 2009.  
4. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are a type of structured 
asset-backed security (ABS) whose value and payments are derived from 
a portfolio of fixed-income underlying assets. To create a CDO, a special 
purpose entity (SPE) is designed to acquire a portfolio of underlying assets 
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as collateral. Common underlying assets held include mortgage-backed 
securities, commercial real estate bonds and corporate loans. The SPE 
issues bonds to investors in exchange for cash, which is used to purchase 
the portfolio of underlying assets. CDOs securities are split into different 
risk classes, or tranches, whereby ―senior‖ tranches are considered the 
safest securities. Interest and principal payments are made in order of 
seniority, so that junior tranches offer higher coupon payments (and 
interest rates) or lower prices to compensate for additional default risk. 
5. The very low U.S. interest rates in this period were hugely lucrative to the 
banks, allowing them to take on more debt, improve the terms of their 
business and expand its volume. They sponsored hedge funds and private 
equity buyouts, packaged their own mortgage-related financial instruments, 
arranged bond insurance, and furnished lines of credit to their own 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and ―conduits‖. These bets were 
usually leveraged by extra helpings of debt, with some institutions, the 
investment banks and hedge funds, borrowing to buy assets worth as much 
as thirty times their capital. This is the core of the shadow banking system 
as we explained in that section. 
6. In 2004, as regulators warned that subprime lenders were saddling 
borrowers with mortgages they could not afford, the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development helped fuel more of that risky lending. 
Eager to put more low-income and minority families into their own homes, 
the agency required that two government-chartered mortgage finance firms 
purchase far more ―affordable‖ loans made to these borrowers. HUD stuck 
with an outdated policy that allowed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to count 
billions of dollars they invested in subprime loans as a public good that 
would foster affordable housing. The agency neglected to examine whether 
borrowers could make the payments on the loans that Freddie and Fannie 
classified as affordable. From 2004 to 2006, the two purchased U.S. $434 
billion in securities backed by subprime loans, creating a market for more 
such lending. Subprime loans are targeted toward borrowers with poor 
credit, and they generally carry higher interest rates than conventional 
loans. Today, 3 million to 4 million families are expected to lose their homes 
to foreclosure because they cannot afford their high-interest subprime 
loans. Lower-income and minority home buyers who were supposed to 
benefit from HUD‘s actions are falling into default at a rate at least three 
times that of other borrowers. Housing experts and some congressional 
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leaders now view those decisions as mistakes that contributed to an 
escalation of subprime lending that is roiling the U.S. economy. 
7. The Community Reinvestment Act (or CRA, Pub.L. 95-128, title VIII of the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977) is a United States 
federal law designed to encourage commercial banks and savings 
associations to meet the needs of borrowers in all segments of their 
communities, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. 
Congress passed the Act in 1977 to reduce discriminatory credit practices 
against low-income neighborhoods, a practice known as redlining. The Act 
requires the appropriate federal financial supervisory agencies to 
encourage regulated financial institutions to meet the credit needs of the 
local communities in which they are chartered, consistent with safe and 
sound operation (Section 802). To enforce the statute, federal regulatory 
agencies examine banking institutions for CRA compliance, and take this 
information into consideration when approving applications for new bank 
branches or for mergers or acquisitions (Section 804). 
8. A credit default swap (CDS) is a swap contract and agreement in which the 
protection buyer of the CDS makes a series of payments (often referred to 
as the CDS ―fee‖ or ―spread‖) to the protection seller and, in exchange, 
receives a payoff if a credit instrument (typically a bond or loan) 
experiences a credit event. It is a form of reverse trading. In its simplest 
form, a credit default swap is a bilateral contract between the buyer and 
seller of protection. The CDS will refer to a "reference entity" or "reference 
obligor", usually a corporation or government. The reference entity is not a 
party to the contract. The protection buyer makes quarterly premium 
payments—the "spread"—to the protection seller. If the reference entity 
defaults, the protection seller pays the buyer the par value of the bond in 
exchange for physical delivery of the bond, although settlement may also 
be by cash or auction. A default is referred to as a "credit event" and 
includes such events as failure to pay, restructuring and bankruptcy. Most 
CDSs are in the $10–$20 million range with maturities between one and 10 
years. A holder of a bond may ―buy protection‖ to hedge its risk of default. 
In this way, a CDS is similar to credit insurance, although CDS are not 
similar to or subject to regulations governing casualty or life insurance. Also, 
investors can buy and sell protection without owning any debt of the 
reference entity. These ―naked credit default swaps‖ allow traders to 
speculate on debt issues and the creditworthiness of reference entities. 
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Credit default swaps can be used to create synthetic long and short 
positions in the reference entity. Naked CDS constitute most of the market 
in CDS. In addition, credit default swaps can also be used in capital 
structure arbitrage. 
9. The High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, as 
of Apr. 30, 2007, was down a whopping 23 per cent for the year. The 
situation is so bleak that Bear Stearns‘ asset management group is 
suspending redemptions at the onetime U.S. $642 million fund – meaning 
investors have no choice but to sit on their losses. 
10. A stated income loan is a mortgage where the lender does not verify the 
borrower‘s income by looking at their pay stubs, W-2 forms, income tax 
returns, or other records. Instead, borrowers are simply asked to state their 
income, and taken at their word. These loans are sometimes called ―liar 
loans‖. Stated income loans are nominally intended for self-employed 
borrowers, or other borrowers who might have difficulty documenting their 
income. These loans have been extended to customers with a wide range 
of credit histories, including subprime borrowers. The lack of verification 
makes these loans particularly simple targets for fraud. Stated income 
loans were originated by Ameriquest. 
11. New York (MarketWatch) – Morgan Stanley said it laid off about 300 
bankers in its credit trading, structured products and leveraged lending 
areas as a result of the freeze in activity in global credit markets. The 
layoffs range from managing directors to associates, including several 
senior people who traded and sold mortgage-backed securities and worked 
on arranging loans for private-equity firms‘ leveraged buyouts. The bulk of 
the layoffs are occurring in the U.S. though about 70 to 80 people are 
losing jobs in Europe and a handful in Asia. 
12. This limit refers to the conforming mortgage limit. 
13. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is a United States government 
agency created as part of the National Housing Act of 1934. Insured loans 
made by banks and other private lenders for home building and home 
buying. The goals of this organisation are: to improve housing standards 
and conditions; to provide an adequate home financing system through 
insurance of mortgage loans; and to stabilise the mortgage market. 
14. The Reserve Primary Fund is a large money market mutual fund which is 
managed by Reserve Management Corporation (RMC). On September 16, 
2008, it lowered its share price below U.S. $1 (―breaking the buck‖) 
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because RMC decided to write U.S. $785 million held in Lehman Brothers 
debt down to zero. This resulted in demands from investors to return their 
funds as the financial crisis mounted. The net asset value of the fund‘s 
share is 97 cents and normally, the NAV of money market funds is kept at 
U.S. $1. This is the first time since 1994 that this has happened to a money 
market fund. 
15. The withdrawals from money funds were stunning. They generated by far 
the highest redemptions on record, losing U.S. $144.5 billion through 
earlier this past week, according to AMG Data Services. The industry had 
only U.S. $7.1 billion in redemptions the week before. The redemptions 
subsequently created huge problems for the U.S. $1.7 trillion 
commercial-paper market. Money funds were not buying the paper 
anymore and were dumping it to cash out fleeing investors. This threatened 
to tip the economy into recession by cutting off a vital funding source for 
U.S. business. The funds‘ push into Treasurys helped pull their short-term 
yields down to zero, which backfired on the money funds. On Friday, fund 
tracker Lipper said that more than 40 per cent of the 1,263 U.S. taxable 
money-market mutual funds it tracks posted zero returns amid their 
negligible returns from their concentration in government paper. As a result 
of money funds‘ buyers strike, commercial paper became increasingly 
expensive; soaring to 8 per cent yields from a little more than 2 per cent the 
week before as investors demanded to get paid more for taking on 
increasing risk. Companies like International Business Machines Corp. had 
to pay as much as 6 per cent for such borrowing this week. 
16. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson proposed a plan under which the 
U.S. Treasury would buy up to U.S. $700 billion of illiquid mortgage backed 
securities (MBS) with the intent to increase the liquidity of the secondary 
mortgage markets and reduce potential losses encountered by financial 
institutions owning the securities. This plan can be described as a risky 
investment, as opposed to an expense. The MBS within the scope of the 
purchase program have rights to the cash flows from the underlying 
mortgages. As such, the initial outflow of government funds to purchase the 
MBS would be offset by ongoing cash inflows represented by the monthly 
mortgage payments. Further, the government eventually may be able to 
sell the assets, though whether at a gain or loss will remain to be seen. 
While incremental borrowing to obtain the funds necessary to purchase the 
MBS may add to the United Stated public debt, the net effect will be 
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considerably less as the incremental debt will be offset to a large extent by 
the MBS assets.  
The original proposal was submitted to the United States House of 
Representatives and then expanded and put forth as an amendment to H.R. 
3997. The amendment was rejected via a vote of the House of 
Representatives on September 29, 2008, voting 205-228. On October 1, 
2008, the Senate debated and voted on an amendment to H.R. 1424, 
which substituted a newly revised version of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilisation Act of 2008 for the language of H.R. 1424. The Senate 
accepted the amendment and passed the entire amended bill, voting 74-25. 
The amended version of H.R. 1424 was sent to the House for consideration, 
and on October 3, the House voted 263-171 to enact the bill into law. 
President George W. Bush signed the bill into law within hours of its 
congressional enactment, creating the U.S. $700 billion Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) to purchase failing bank assets. 
17. The Republican Party is one of the two major contemporary political parties 
in the United States, along with the Democratic Party. Founded by 
anti-slavery expansion activists in 1854, it is often called the Grand Old 
Party (GOP). 
18. The Federal Reserve Board announced the creation of the Money Market 
Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), which will support a private-sector 
initiative designed to provide liquidity to U.S. money market investors. 
Under the MMIFF, authorized by the Board under section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) will 
provide senior secured funding to a series of special purpose vehicles to 
facilitate an industry-supported private-sector initiative to finance the 
purchase of eligible assets from eligible investors. Eligible assets will 
include U.S. dollar-denominated certificates of deposit and commercial 
paper issued by highly rated financial institutions and having remaining 
maturities of 90 days or less. Eligible investors will include U.S. money 
market mutual funds and over time may include other U.S. money market 
investors. The short-term debt markets have been under considerable 
strain in recent weeks as money market mutual funds and other investors 
have had difficulty selling assets to satisfy redemption requests and meet 
portfolio rebalancing needs. By facilitating the sales of money market 
instruments in the secondary market, the MMIFF should improve the 
liquidity position of money market investors, thus increasing their ability to 
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meet any further redemption requests and their willingness to invest in 
money market instruments. Improved money market conditions will 
enhance the ability of banks and other financial intermediaries to 
accommodate the credit needs of businesses and households. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
References: 
1. Obama, B. (2008). Change We Can Believe In: Barack Obama’s Plan to 
Renew America’s Promise. USA: Three Rivers Press. 
2. Ivry, B. (2008). Paulson Seeks Mortgage Value That Eluded Bear, Lehman. 
Bloomberg. Retrieved June 27,2010, from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid
=aGT_xTYzbbQE 
3. Cox, J. & Glapa, L. (2009). Credit crisis timeline. Iowa: The University of 
Iowa.  
4. Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (2007). Bear Stearns Annual Report 2006. 
Retrieved May 12, 2011, from 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/7453453/Bear-Stearns-Annual-Report-2006 
5. Bajaj, V. & Creswell, J. (2007). $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to 
Rescue Fund. New York Times. Retrieved April 16, 2008, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html?pagewanted=1 
6. Siew, W. & Yoon, A. (2007). Bear Stearns CDO liquidation sparks 
contagion fears. Reuters. Retrieved June 21, 2007, from 
http://yahoo.reuters.com/news/articlehybrid.aspx?storyID=urn:newsml:reut
ers.com:20070621:MTFH14355_2007-06-21_17-34-09_N21364255&type
=comktNews&rpc=44 
7. Pittman, M. (2007). Bear Stearns Fund Collapse Sends Shock Through 
CDOs. Bloomberg. Retrieved April 16, 2008, from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a7LCp2Acv2a
w&refer=home 
8. Barr, A. & Morcroft, G. (2008). J.P. Morgan to buy Bear Stearns for $2 a 
share. MarketWatch. Retrieved March 17, 2008, from 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/jp-morgan-to-buy-bear-stearns-for-2-a-
share 
9. Onaran, Y. (2008). Fed Aided Bear Stearns as Firm Faced Chapter 11, 
Bernanke Says. Bloomberg. Retrieved April 2, 2008, from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=worldwide
&sid=a7coicThgaEE 
10. Dash, E. & Thomas, L. (25 March 2008). Seeking Fast Deal, JP Morgan 
Quintuples Bear Stearns Bid. The New York Times. 
11. White, B. (29 May 2008). Bear Stearns passes into Wall Street history. 
Financial Times. 
55 
 
12. Kulikowski, L. (2007). Lehman Brothers Amputates Mortgage Arm. The 
Street.com. Retrieved March 18, 2008, from 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10375812/1/lehman-brothers-amputates-m
ortgage-arm.html 
13. Times-Picayune. (2008). Dow plunges nearly 300 points on concern about 
Lehman. Times-Picayune. Retrieved September 9, 2008, from 
http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2008/09/dow_plunges_nearly_300
_points.html. Retrieved 2008-09-09. 
14. Anderson, J. & White, B. (9 September 2008). Wall Street‘s Fears on 
Lehman Bros. Batter Markets. The New York Times. 
15. Bruno, J.B. (10 September 2008). Lehman shares slip on plans to auction 
off unit, consider sale of company. The Seattle Times. 
16. Anderson, J., Andrews, E.L., Bajaj, V. & Dash, E. (12 September 2008). 
U.S. Gives Banks Urgent Warning to Solve Crisis. The New York Times. 
17. Anderson, J. & White, B. (14 September 2008). Lehman Heads Toward 
Brink as Barclays Ends Talks. The New York Times. 
18. Mamudi, S. (15 September 2008). Lehman folds with record $613 billion 
debt. The Wall Street Journal. 
19. Jones, C.I. (2009). The Global Financial Crisis: Overview. Retrieved May 
12, 2011, from 
http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/mccafferty/econ502.02/CurrentEvents
2009.pdf 
20. Investopedia. (2010). What is securitization? Investopedia. Retrieved May 
12, 2011, from 
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/07/securitization.asp 
21. Demyanyk, Y.S. & Van Hemert, O. (2008). Understanding the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis. Working Paper Series. Social Science Electronic 
Publishing. Retrieved September 18, 2008, from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396 
22. Baily, M.N. & Elliott, D.J. (2009). The US Financial and Economic Crisis. 
Retrieved October 20, 2010, from 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott.
aspx 
23. Zandi, M. (2010). The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis. 
Retrieved January 13, 2010, from  
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0113-Zandi.pdf 
24. Williams, M.T. (2010). Uncontrolled Risk. USA: McGraw-Hill. 
56 
 
25. Boyd, R. (31 March 2008). The last days of Bear Stearns. CNN Money. 
Retrieved September 30, 2008, from 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boyd_bear.fortune/ 
26. Blackburn, R. (2008). The Subprime Crisis. New Left Review 50, 
March-April 2008: 63-106.  
27. Farcaster. (2008). Leverage Ratios for Major Investment Banks. Retrieved 
October 16, 2008, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Leverage_Ratios.png 
28. Wikipedia Foundation, Inc. (2010). United States Census Bureau, Median 
and Average Sales Prices of New Homes Sold in United States 1963-2008 
Annual Data. Retrieved January 4, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Median_and_Average_Sales_Prices_of_N
ew_Homes_Sold_in_United_States_1963-2008_annual.png 
29. Perry, M.J. (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Subprime Mortgage Market. 
Mjperry.blogspot.com. Retrieved February 27, 2009, from 
http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2008/07/rise-and-fall-of-subprime-mortgage.ht
ml 
30. U.S. Census Bureau & Harvard University. (2008). State of the Nation’s 
Housing Report 2008. USA: Harvard University. 
31. REA (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis). (2009). U.S. Current Account or 
Trade Deficit: Dollars and % GDP. Retrieved April 19, 2009, from 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/U.S._Trade_Deficit_D
ollars_and_percentage_GDP.png 
32. Bernanke, B.S. (2007). Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, At the Bundesbank 
Lecture, Berlin, Germany. September 11, 2007: Global Imbalances: Recent 
Developments and Prospects. Federalreserve.gov. 
33. Nguyen, E.L. (2008). The International Investment Position of the United 
States at Yearend 2007. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
34. Shiller, R.J. (2001). Bubbles, Human Judgment, and Expert Opinion. 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1303. Yale University. 
35. Bernanke, B.S. (2008). Mortgage Delinquencies and Foreclosures. 
Columbia Business School‘s 32nd Annual Dinner, New York. 
36. Clifford, C. (13 November 2008). 85,000 homes lost in October. CNN 
Money. 
37. Andrews, E.L. & Uchitelle, L. (22 February 2008). Rescues for 
Homeowners in Debt Weighted. The New York Times. 
57 
 
38. Liebowitz, S. (3 July 2009). New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis. The 
Wall Street Journal, p. A13. 
39. Feldstein, M. (18 November 2008). How to Help People Whose Home 
Values Are Underwater. The Wall Street Journal, p. A21. 
40. Reinhart, C.M. & Rogoff, K.S. (2009). This Time is Different: Eight 
Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
41. CFA Institute. (2006). Program Curriculum Volume II: Economics and 
Financial Statement Analysis. Boston: Pearson. 
42. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). (2009). 
The Global Economic Crisis: Systemic Failures and Multilateral Remedies. 
New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
43. Gelinas, N. (2009). Can the Fed Uncrunch Credit? Citi-journal.org. 
Retrieved February 27, 2009, from 
http://www.city-journal.org/2009/19_1_credit.html 
44. Krugman, P. (2009). The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 
2008. USA: W.W. Norton Company Limited. 
45. G20. (2008). Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World 
Economy. Whitehouse.gov. Retrieved February 27, 2009, from 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/11/2008
1115-1.html 
46. Claessens, S., Dell‘Ariccia, G., Igan, D. & Laeven, L. (2010). Lessons and 
Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis. IMF Working Paper, 
WP/10/44. 
47. Dehesa, G. (2007). How to avoid further credit and liquidity confidence 
crises. In The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century. Edited by 
Felton, A. & Reinhart, C. London: A VoxEU.org Publication. 
48. Nanto, D.K. (2009). The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy 
Implications. Washington: Congressional Research Service. 
 
 
 
 
 
